



NATIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT REPORT

Full Report of the Special Summit
on National Security



JUNE 2021

FINAL EDITION



**SPECIAL SUMMIT ON
NATIONAL SECURITY
2021**

Patriotism consists not in waving the flag,
but in striving that our country shall be
righteous as well as strong.

James Bryce



PREFACE

The threat of terrorism, crime, extreme nationalism, and environmental damage continues to evolve, and troubling gaps in national security and homeland defence present new and complex challenges. To safeguard the lives and livelihood of Nigerian citizens and rebuild the waning confidence that Nigerians have of the country's security estate, it is imperative to move against existing threats to national security by putting forward strategies that will urgently address the current spate of insecurity in Nigeria. This **National Security Summit Report** (NSSR) sets forth extensive recommendations generated from the National Security Summit organised by the Nigerian House of Representatives to review the security situation in the country. The report also builds on existing national strategic documents including the National Counter Terrorism Strategy, Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy, the National Defence Policy and the Economics Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP).

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

THE FOUR (4) CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE NSSR ARE TO:

- To review the success of the summit against predetermined key performance indicators (KPIs) and summit objectives and share key recommendations from desk research and summit outputs.
- To consolidate historic and recently developed recommendations, from a diverse range of stakeholders across the country, that address existing and developing national security challenges.
- To capture lessons learned, document success factors, and explore the areas of potential improvement drawing from the National Security Summit and similar historical actions to address national security issues.
- To develop a guideline implementation plan and summary of key recommendations for Legislative action and Executive order.

In spearheading the commissioning of the National Security Summit Report (NSSR), the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives together acknowledge the complex security challenges that Nigerians encounter daily and are confident that this report will lay the foundation for securing and strengthening security and prosperity for Nigerian citizens.

FOREWORD



FOREWORD

BY THE

HONOURABLE SPEAKER of The House Of Representatives

With the many security challenges facing the country, all hands have to be on deck and all arms of government have to do all that is possible to contribute ideas and actions that will birth the solutions needed to secure the lives and properties of Nigerians as envisaged in Section 14 (2)(b) of our Constitution which states that:

*“The security and welfare of the people shall be the **primary purpose** of government”.*

It is in this spirit that I welcome and commend this report as a special contribution of the 9th House of Representatives to the solution mix for a more secure country.

The causes of our insecurity are diverse and multifaceted. But this report encompasses the wide spectrum of causations of insecurity and provides dozens of recommendations for both Legislative and Executive actions. The House of Representatives will take its responsibilities seriously and work to deliver a legislative agenda and program that will seek to deliver on its own elements of the recommendations. I also have assurances from Mr President, Commander in Chief, that he will implement all the recommendations that he deems practicable.

This report is a product of extensive engagements with key stakeholders and contributions from pertinent players in our National Security; from the security agencies, experts and academics, civil society organisations, and many Nigerians with direct knowledge of our security situation. No one report or one action can fully resolve a complex national security puzzle such as we face as a nation. But I am confident that this report will add to the inventory of solutions that can assist the nation in overcoming the insecurity that is widespread in our country.

I commend this report to all and hope in the years to come, history will be kind to the 9th House of Representatives when many of the recommendations contained in this report are implemented successfully for the safety and security of all Nigerians.

Rt Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila
SPEAKER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Honourable Speaker of the House of Representatives, Federal Republic of Nigeria Rt Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila and the members of the Special House Committee on National Security would like to thank the President, Commander in Chief, President Muhammadu Buhari for his support for the summit and for sending the SGF Boss Mustapha to represent him.

We also wish to thank all living former Heads of State and Presidents for their messages of support and commendations.

Our appreciation goes to the Senate President, Dr Ahmed Lawan, HRH The Ooni of Ife Oba Adeyeye Enitan Ogunwusi, Ojaja II; The Sultan of Sokoto, His Eminence Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar, CFR, HRH the Eze Ilomuaya; the Chief of Defence Staff and Service Chiefs, the Director General of the National Intelligence Agency, the Hon Minister for Finance & National Planning Hajia Zainab Ahmed, representatives of the Minister of Defence, the Inspector General of Police, NSCDC as well as all the dignitaries that attended the opening day of the Summit.

Our thanks go additionally to the contributors and resource persons who provided submissions, without whom the National Security Summit and this National Security Summit Report would not have been completed.

ACRONYMS

ABP	Anchor Borrowers Programme
ACJA	Administration of Criminal Justice Act
AFN	AFN Armed Forces of Nigeria
AFRIPOL	African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation
APS	APS African Partnership Station
AQIM	AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BHT	Boko Haram Terrorists
BVN	Bank Verification Number
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CDD	Centre for Democracy & Development
CCR	Central Criminal Registry
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CNAI	Critical National Assets and Infrastructure
CNII	Critical National Information Infrastructure
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COPAZ	Co-Prosperity Alliance Zone
CPPA	Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT-COIN	Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency
DSA	Defence Space Administration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIMS	ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EPI	Environmental Performance Index
ERGP	Economic Recovery and Growth Plan
FAAN	Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HSOP	Harmonised Standard Operating Procedures
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
ICC	Intelligence Community Committee
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHR	International Health Regulations

ACRONYMS

INET	Investments in New Energy Technologies
IoT	Internet of Things
IRT	Intelligence Response Unit
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
ISO	International Standard Organisation
JIB	Joint Intelligence Board
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authority
MACP	Military Aid to Civil Power
MCCC	Military Command and Control Centre
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIC	Military Industrial Complex
MLAILPKC	Martin Luther Agwai International Leadership and Peace Keeping Centre
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NA	Nigerian Army
NACTEST	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NAF	Nigerian Air Force
NAMA	Nigerian Airspace Management Agency
NAP	National Action Plan
NAPTIP	National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NASRDA	National Space Research and Development Agency
NCAA	Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority
NCMC	National Crisis Management Centre
NCPS	National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy
NCS	Nigeria Customs Service
NDC	National Defence Council
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEC	National Economic Council
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NFIU	Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMASA	Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
NIMET	Nigeria Meteorological Agency
NIS	Nigerian Immigration Service
NME	Nigerian Maritime Environment
NN	Nigerian Navy
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
NRC	Nigeria Railway Corporation
NSC	National Security Council
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
NSS	National Security Strategy

ACRONYMS

NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RIFU	Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SBS	Special Boat Service
SCIPC	Strategic Communication Inter-Agency Policy Committee
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIP	Social Investment Programmes
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SME	Small and Medium-scale Enterprise
SRE	Surveillance, Response and Enforcement
SSS	State Security Service
STEM	Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
STI	Science, Technology, and Innovation
TAC	Technical Aid Corps
TICAD	Tokyo International Cooperation for African Development
TOC	Transnational Organised Crimes
TRACON	Total Radar Coverage of Nigeria
TSA	Treasury Single Account
TSMS	Total Spectrum Maritime Strategy
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UBE	Universal Basic Education
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
YES-P	Youth Entrepreneurship Support Programme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The National Security Summit was organised by the Nigerian House of Representatives to review the security situation in the country. In noting the urgency of the security crises in all parts of the country, The Speaker, Honourable Femi Gbajabiamila, during his welcome speech stated that “at this time of our national history, when insecurity threatens the authority of the state and the foundations of our nationhood with the activities of insurgents, bandits, and criminals of every stripe impede our efforts at progress and prosperity we must confront the realisation that our previous and current approaches to addressing the challenges of insecurity have not yielded desired result.”

It is in view of this that the House of Representatives commissioned the National Security Summit Report (NSSR), a document that sets forth extensive recommendations generated from the Summit. The NSSR therefore is a compendium of suggestions, ideas, and opinions harnessed from academics, experts, strategists, sector leaders, and concerned citizens, on precise solutions for urgently addressing the current spate of insecurity in Nigeria. The report also builds on existing national documents including the National Security Strategy; the National Cybersecurity Strategy; the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE); and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP). The National Security Summit set out to achieve the following objectives:

- *Conduct a legislative review of the National Security Policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria to identify areas of possible amendment and improvement.*

- *Provide an arena for frank conversations intended to harness the views, opinions, ideas and recommendations of critical stakeholders in the national security space so that those submissions inform the final recommendations of the committee.*
- *Conduct a comprehensive and innovative assessment of the solutions to national security challenges from the Local, State, National security space so that those submissions inform the final recommendations of the Committee.*
- *Produce recommendations that will inform both Executive actions, and Legislative reforms.*

The National Security Summit commenced on the 26th and ended on the 29th of May. Originally slated to commence on the 24th of May, the summit was postponed to acknowledge and respect the passing of Lieutenant General Ibrahim Attahiru, who along with several other officers lost their lives in a ghastly plane crash. The Speaker of the House, honoured the sacrifices and commitment of the Chief of Army staff and the soldiers. A minute silence was observed.

The Summit opened with speeches from notable leaders including the Speaker of the House of Representatives who highlighted the importance of the Summit as a platform for having honest conversations about “who we are, where we are, how we got here, and the choices we must make to guarantee a safe future for all our nation’s children.” In recognising that the national ambitions of the country will not be attained without lasting peace and security, the Speaker further stated that the Summit is the forum where citizens and public servants jointly “find solutions to problems of insecurity in our country.” In alignment with this position, President Muhammadu Buhari, represented by Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Boss Mustapha, reiterated his administration’s commitment to ending the war against insurgency.

Traditional rulers, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Ooni of Ife, and the Eze of Ilomuanya also gave speeches, most of which vehemently decried the state of insecurity across all regions in the country. HRH the Sultan of Sokoto harped on the importance of implementing policies with “honesty, sincerity, and the fear of God.” HRH the Ooni of Ife gave an impassioned speech where he emphasized the importance of involving young people. For him it is unproductive “for us to be doing the same thing over and over, and over again and expect a different result.” In his view, the security problems in the country are well known, the perpetrators are also well known, as they are mostly young people between the ages of 18-39.

He further opined that the massive economic and social dissatisfaction rampant in the country is more felt by young people, who are “hungry and angry.” In suggesting ways to deal with the crises of insecurity, he posited that the government, both the legislative and executive arms, must focus on empowering and funding local and governments whose primary duty is to serve local populations of which the youth are largely represented. HRH the Eze of Ilomuanya highlighted the importance of a “patriotic commitment devoid of any political or sectional interests or sentiments to overcoming (the security

challenges, as) crime neither knows any political party, the rich nor the poor.”

Considering all these speeches, the overwhelming sentiment of all leaders was one of cautious optimism, that the Summit will fulfil its set objectives. The Summit achieved this as it transitioned to closed-door sessions where several resource persons made presentations and shared strategies on how to deal with security crises within the following domains: National, Regional, and Thematic concerns. In discussing national and regional concerns, presenters examined the ways insecurity has impacted regions of the State differently.

Importantly however, the discussions that ensued from the presentations, and questions asked from Committee members, in addition to the reviews made of recommendations given were mostly guided by the following thematic concerns, namely: Local Community Level Security Options and Solutions; Strategic Kinetic National Security Solutions; Global Perspectives to Insecurity and International Factors in National Security Solutions; and, Non-Military and Non-Kinetic Security Options and Solutions.

Worth noting is that, in addition to the presentations made, stakeholders, drawn from different domains of national life, were consulted to share recommendations prior to the Summit. These contributions were incorporated in the NSSR.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

NORTH-EASTERN STATES: Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa

Boko Haram (BH) and ISIS-West Africa's (ISIS-WA) continued attacks on government and security forces, and civilians in the northeast, have resulted in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the capture and destruction of property. BH attacks do not appear to discriminate between civilians and government officials, whereas ISIS-WA tends to generally focus on government and security forces, while trying to cultivate stronger ties with local communities, including the provision of social welfare packages and services. Nigeria continues to work with other affected neighbours under the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter BH and ISIS-WA in order to regain control of the territory.



NORTH-WESTERN STATES - Banditry, Kidnappings

Populations in Northwest Nigeria are facing the ever increasing threat of banditry, a type of organized crime that includes kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape, cattle rustling and the exploitation of environmental resources. Armed banditry has become a central security challenge to Nigeria's northwest that has terrorized communities, killed and displaced thousands, hindered socio-economic development and threatened democratic governance.

Since 2011, there has been a surge in attacks between the Fulani herdsmen and sedentary Hausa farming. This is a result of environmental and ecological changes which has caused land and water to become valuable commodities, sparking fierce and often violent competition over resources. Over the years, this banditry has evolved from a communal rivalry into lethal militia groups. The boko haram organization, aiming to expand its base beyond the northeast, has started forming alliances with some of these bandit groups in the northwest.

Informal security groups such as the vigilantes have played a crucial role in protecting the communities from these bandit groups. The federal government has also deployed police and military operations to states like Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger and Sokoto. This security response pushed back attacks, destroyed hideouts and killed and arrested hundreds of bandits. The governors of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara also secured a peace deal with these armed bandits. Despite all these measures, the insecurity challenges in the North-western states still continue.

NORTH CENTRAL STATES - Herdsmen and Farmers

Land disputes and competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions have contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. Ethnocultural and religious affiliation have been some of the factors attributed to some local conflicts. Nevertheless, many international organizations, including International Crisis Group, assessed that these divisions were incidental to the farmer-herder conflict. During the past year, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in north-central states steadily slowed due to government policies and civil society conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Nevertheless, 'silent killings,' in which individuals disappeared and later were found dead, have intensified over the past few months, and confidence in the State and the security apparatus has waned deeply among Nigerians in this region. Indeed, conflicts concerning land rights have continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.

SOUTH-SOUTH STATES - Niger Delta concerns, Kidnappings, and Banditry

The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region's share of oil revenues and its marginalisation in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria's oil industry,

slashing earnings from its exports, the country's major revenue source. A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability, and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed.

SOUTH-EASTERN NIGERIA - Secessionist Demands, the Menace of Unknown Gunmen, Kidnappings

The secessionist movement, kidnappings and attacks by unknown gunmen in the southeast are some of the serious security challenges facing the region. Tensions have increased in the southeast in recent months in the wake of accusations that a paramilitary wing of IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra), known as the Eastern Security Network, have been involved in clashes with the police and military. Several police stations have been attacked in south-eastern Nigeria since January 2021, with large amounts of ammunition stolen. No groups have claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Kidnapping is also very prevalent in the south-eastern states of Nigeria. This has created fear among the indigenes of south-eastern states, who are resident at home or abroad. The pervasive insecurity created by kidnapping activities is a manifestation of the breach of social contract by the Nigeria government and a consequent manifestation of frustration.

SOUTH-WESTERN NIGERIA - Banditry, Kidnappings, Massacre in Villages

In the south west, kidnapping and banditry have become the order of the day. The rural settlements used to be one of the safest areas to live. However, many of the rural areas in this region have devolved to kill zones, where ordinary people are mostly unsafe in their homes. Additionally, the spate of kidnappings have intensified and shifted from highways targeting road travellers, to targeting people visiting the countryside.

Also, a lot of villages have been ravaged by unknown gunmen, or alleged Fulani gunmen rendering the dwellers homeless and creating forced migration to other villages or the urban areas.



RECOMMENDATIONS BY THEMATIC AREAS:

1. Local Community Level Security Options and Solutions

The security and maintenance of law and order are not the responsibility of the state alone. The solution for community policing should embrace community stakeholders, namely, vigilantes, hunters, and key stakeholders in the community such as security professionals, trade unions, under one umbrella of community security governance. To legitimise this arrangement, there is the need for state and local government enactments. This effort should include security enforcement, local justice system, and conflict management. A return to the local community system where the component of security, local justice system, peacebuilding and conflict management takes hold.

Key Recommendations

- *Early Warning Mechanism: At the community level, early warning systems should be established and connected to effective response systems.*
- *Developing A Strong National Identity within Communities: Communities have local methods for addressing traditional grievances. These tools for addressing traditional grievances can be incorporated into the State security infrastructure, they include: dialogue, negotiations, mediation, and inclusiveness. Additionally, concerted effort should also be made to instil traditional values, norms, and practices as a means of community social order.*
- *There is the need to improve local government authority to enable it perform its functions effectively. There should also be local government autonomy.*
- *Involve traditional institutions in local security governance*
- *Set up structures for observing and reporting the behaviour of security military personnel from community to national levels*
- *Create structure to make security personnel accountable to both the state and communities*
- *Vigilante Groups: Vigilante Groups have played a formidable role in*

addressing the gaps left open by the absence or inadequate presence of security operatives. This is especially so because they know the terrain of the bushes and forests, and sometimes have had relationships in the past with criminal persons of interest. Given this gap, it is imperative to include vigilante groups in the security infrastructure, and seek ways to institutionalize them within the local security estate. In turn, they can be called to serve to prevent and resolve conflicts in high tension areas or communities, and can be deployed to protect critical national assets such as dams and river basins, schools and hospitals, industrial areas, motor parks, airports, seaports and rural markets. Vigilante groups can be provided with vehicles and other logistics support to enable them to complement the effort of the police in patrolling neighbourhoods especially inner road networks and streets at night

- *Facilitating timely identification and referral of critical situations: The reasons why people are easily radicalized or embrace violence are often linked to real or perceived grievances, including violations of their rights, experiences of discrimination, and controversial policies. To facilitate timely identification and referral of critical situations, a process of continuous engagement with community police officers, who are trusted by the communities they serve, would enable the proper identification and response to emerging crisis situations, that have the potential to escalate to violence.*
- *Create standing community security forums bringing together local police commanders, traditional rulers, youths, women leaders, local business people and religious leaders, to discuss security concerns and solutions on a weekly basis.*
- *Implement and Strengthen the Framework for Community Policing – The philosophy of community policing is hinged on the principle of systematic partnership, participatory approaches, organizational strategies, and problem-solving techniques to tackle the problem of insecurity in the country. This strategy helps to build a relationship between security operatives and local communities.*

2. Strategic Kinetic National Security Solutions

There have been several instances in the history of Nigeria where kinetic solutions have been deployed successfully. The most notable use of kinetic force in Nigeria began in 2012 when Boko Haram staged coordinated attacks on military and civilian targets across northern Nigeria, including near-weekly suicide bombings in major population centres. In response to these attacks, President Goodluck Jonathan, in May 2013, declared a state of emergency in three Northeast states—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.

Key Recommendations

- *The security agencies should be equipped and trained with modern technological gadgets for detecting bombs among others.*
- *Organize coordinated strikes and attacks on the leadership of the insurgent groups such as ISIS-WA and Boko Haram. The essence is not to go to the fringes*

but to attack the centre.

- *Recruitment of Soldiers: To deal swiftly and efficiently with insurgent groups, and bandits, more soldiers have to be recruited. The number of soldiers must be expanded by more than 300 thousand soldiers. In essence, the obstacles placed to recruitment have to be lifted. Thereafter, these officers must be properly trained and made ready to carry out their duties.*
- *The Targeted Utilization of Private Security Contractors: The advantage of this is that the mercenaries do not have the sentiments that home-grown soldiers will have. The point is that mercenaries will prosecute a more efficient combat on insurgents. The caveat here is that this is a short term and targeted solution. Therefore, it is imperative that the Nigerian military are then able to consolidate the gains made by mercenaries thereafter.*
- *The military should be given a command to not only repel but to take on an offensive stance against the insurgents. The battalion/sector command should be given delegated authority to take an offensive stance, and to attack insurgents whenever necessary*
- *Proactive Intelligence gathering: intelligent agents must work with community members to fish out Boko Haram informants in the community. If people are assured of their safety, they will not be afraid to work with security agents, if the safety of their lives and property are guaranteed.*
- *Moral Booster for all the security sector players: Police and Soldiers and other officers of the military must be well incentivized with well-paid packages, including life insurance. They should be guaranteed that their bravery will be rewarded by awards and medals granted to them by the State. They should be assured that their families will be properly and adequately cared for upon their demise in the line of duty.*
- *Update machinery and equipment: all equipment utilised by the military must be updated and fully compliant to meet the standards and challenges of present-day warfare.*

3. Global Perspectives to Insecurity and International Factors in National Security Solutions

Across the world in recent times, tactical, organizational, and strategic national security discourse has shifted from traditional warfare to contemporary and complicated warfare. The modern trend of terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed international networks of terrorist groups with religious or ideological undertone. Lessons from other climes has shown that results-oriented counterterrorism measures often include economic sanctions on nations sponsoring terrorism or the use of kinetic measures as the last option. However, counterterrorism would require absolute public support against the terrorist acts to achieve success.

Key Recommendations

- *Get the support of the Great Green Wall as recommended by the African Union (AU).*
- *Partnerships with neighbouring countries, development partners and international countries such as the US and France, which already have strong military presence in the sub-region should be strengthened.*
- *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be more proactive in strengthening the partnership with neighbours, especially CEN-SAD member countries for the security of the sub-region.*
- *The Multinational Joint Task Force should be strengthened and properly coordinated to achieve its mandate. There is a need for a strong legislative oversight function on the Multinational Joint Task Force.*
- *Rededicating Nigeria's resolve to the pursuit of African regional integration with ECOWAS as one of the building blocks. Enhanced interaction with other regional actors would be necessary in this regard especially with the neighbouring States namely Niger and Benin Republic that are members of ECOWAS*
- *Convening of summit level meeting of the LCBC Member-States to address threats to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin, as well as discuss issues pertaining to resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons across the four countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.*
- *Synchronising actions, policies, strategies and programmes with all other agencies, coalitions, groupings and stakeholders in West Africa, the Greater Sahel Region, the Lake Chad Basin and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, to collectively address all human development challenges and other factors like climate change, widespread poverty, food insecurity, threats to livelihood such as pastoralism and sedentary farming, security and safety of commerce, free movement of people and goods, and mitigating the impacts of trans-border crimes such as people smuggling, illegal migration, oil theft and bunkering, the clandestine flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region etc.*

4. Non-Military and Non-Kinetic Security Options and Solutions

Developing countries struggle with stability in government, infrastructure, and overall economic stability, which causes the country to be vulnerable and susceptible to insurgent attacks. As a result, it is important to understand that to form a more stable government, the people must agree and identify with the developmental process. Among the causes of insecurity in Nigeria today are hunger, unemployment, and poverty. It is therefore imperative for the Nigerian State to embark on policies and programmes that ensure food security, employment, and infrastructure development

Key Recommendations

- *Eradicate overlapping mandates. Instead, specific functions need to be outlined for each of the security units which should all collaborate with one another as independent units, that is, from the civil defence, to police, to the military. This takes away the ad-hoc functions of policing imposed on the army, which inevitably strips the populace of confidence in the military.*
- *There should also be the introduction of Forest Guards, to curb the settlement of miscreants and bandits from using these spaces as covering ground. This can be done under the leadership of the NPF but the control of the Forest Guards should be with State Governors.*
- *The intelligent units need to be improved, technologically, resource wise, and the entire apparatus needs to be invested in*
- *Parliament must receive requisite access to classified information about the security conditions in the country to enable proper representation of the people.*
- *Land use act needs to be reviewed. Presently, state governors control the land or are caretakers of the land. Given that this is the case, state governors feel empowered by the constitution to create and perpetuate a culture of land grabbing culture which jeopardises the pristine conditions and security of the forests.*
- *Establishment of a National Crisis Centre. This should be managed by the NPF and be the one-stop shop for Nigerians to report all major security incidents and developments nationwide. Security responses will also be coordinated by this centre.*

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SUMMIT:

The Summit achieved its objectives of:

- *Conducting an extensive review of the state of insecurity, both regional and national.*
- *Achieving the first summit of its kind where honourable members of the House of Representatives are made privy of information about the intensity of the crises, and got to receive and understand the ideas, strategies, and methods with which to address them through the lens of four thematic areas namely, local, kinetic, non-kinetic and global solutions to insecurity.*
- *Enabling members of the Committee undertake a comprehensive assessment of previously utilised methods, and were made to understand better and more efficient ways of addressing national security challenges from the Local, State, National security space*
- *Enabling Members make contributions to the recommendations that have been collected and aggregated in the NSSR*

KEY ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REPORT

In addition to the recommendations shared pre and during the Summit, the NSSR also builds on existing national strategic documents including the the National Security Strategy; the National Cybersecurity Strategy; the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE); and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP). A cursory reading of these policy documents not only indexes the government's perspective on insecurity, they document ways of addressing pressing security concerns.

For instance, the National Security Strategy (NSS) initiated in 2014 by the Goodluck Administration and updated in 2019 by the Buhari administration, documents the ways insecurity can be addressed proactively and dynamically by the Nigerian state. Emphasizing the importance of the and preservation of Nigeria's sovereignty, and the protection of its national interests and territorial integrity, it provides specific action plans for combating terrorism and countering violent extremism; preventing and tackling kidnapping, crushing armed banditry and militia activities; and combating transnational organized crime.

Additionally, it outlines the ways existing state resources and security infrastructure can be efficiently deployed to maintain the integrity of critical national assets and infrastructure; to advance maritime security; airspace and aviation security; and land transportation security. Importantly, it delineates the ways ungoverned spaces will be securitized; and how chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear resources will be protected.

The National Cybersecurity Strategy is a policy document that was developed from the 2004 recommendations made by the Presidential Committee on Illegal Online Activities. It identifies the major threats to national security, including cybercrime, cyber-espionage, cyber conflict, cyber-Terrorism, and child Online Abuse & exploitation. Given the position of the Office of the National Security Adviser on the necessity to urgently tackle these threats, it sets a clear direction on Nigeria's engagements in cyberspace, and defines critical areas of focus for policy actions towards a coordinated cybersecurity engagement, aimed at protecting and defending national interests and the sovereignty of Nigeria.

The National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) articulates the vision of the Nigerian government about specific methods and methodologies for preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria. Derived from research findings, global leading practices, and knowledge of the root causes of violent extremism, it seeks to build capacity, improve coordination, strengthen the justice system, by integrating strategic communication methods, and providing alternative narratives to violent extremism.

Specifically, the policy is designed to strengthen current programs such as the Operations Safe Corridor, and the Nigeria Prison De-Radicalization Program. The policy document ensures that the action plan towards Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is institutionalized and mainstreamed into mandates of Ministries, Departments and Agencies of Governments, including at States and Local Levels.

The overall objective is to partner with these institutions of government in order to guarantee the safety and resiliency of vulnerable communities that are prone to radicalism violent extremism. The position of the policy recognizes that kinetic measures alone cannot fully address the threats attending violent extremism. Hence, the policy provides a non-kinetic framework that utilizes a Whole-of-Government Approach – a collaborative and coordinated inter/intragovernmental position - ; and a Whole-of-Society Approach - an integrated stakeholders position -, to countering violent extremism.

The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), a Medium-Term Plan for 2017 – 2020, was developed by the Buhari administration to restore economic growth. The Plan prioritizes science, technology and innovation as drivers of economic growth. It pivots from existing sectoral strategies such as the National Industrial Revolution Plan, and the Nigeria Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan. It works towards reinforcing the successful components of previous strategies and plans while addressing challenges observed in their implementation.

As a plan that focuses on economic recovery, it aligns with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) addressing the three-dimensional issues at the centre of SDGs: economic, social and environmental sustainability. Given the government's position to drive growth, the plan therefore provides a blueprint that will establish the economic advancement of future generations of Nigerians, as it concentrates on youth capacity building.

Considering that these policy documents and plans already exist, why then is it necessary to develop another document that reiterates already recommended strategies? The House of Representatives under the leadership of Honourable Femi Gbajabiamila, launched the National Security Summit, and commissioned the NSSR as a working document that articulates pressing solutions to the security crises across the country. The NSSR therefore achieves its objective which is to serve as a compendium of all recommendations that address all fields that security challenges and crisis that may arise. The goal of the House in commissioning the Report is to reassure Nigerians that the primary duty of the state, which is to prioritize the security of the polity and to ensure the safety of Nigerians, shall be undertaken.



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I. Country Context

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and diverse federation of thirty-six (36) states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), over 250 ethnic groups, three indigenous languages (Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba) and English as the official language.

Nigeria has an abundance of rich natural resources that include oil, gas, and solid minerals, a population of over 263 million people, and nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of about USD\$514 billion in 2021. Approximately 70% of the population engage in agriculture. However, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, 40 percent of the total population, approximately 83 million people, live below the country's poverty line (137,430 Naira ~ USD\$381.75 per year). The inequality rate in the country is 0.32% with 65% of assets in the hands of 20% of the population while the remaining 80% of the population controls only 35%. According to the UNDP Human development Report (2018), Nigeria had a human development index of 0.539%, ranks low on many human development indicators (158 out of 189 countries in 2014).

With a land area of about 923,768 sq.km, Nigeria has a diverse climate and terrain, ranging from the equatorial climate of the southern lowlands, through the tropical

Figure 1. Map of Nigeria



central hills and plateau, to the semi-arid northern plains which border the Sahara Desert to the south. Two major rivers run through Nigeria- Niger and Benue. The River Niger flows from the Northwest through the country to its vast delta in the South, while River Benue has its source in the Cameroon Mountains and flows into the country from the east joining River Niger at Lokoja in Kogi State (Figure 1). Nigeria has borders with Niger to the North, Chad (across Lake Chad) to the Northeast, Cameroon to the East and Benin to the West. It is indented in the South by the Gulf of Guinea.

In recent times, fragility, conflict, and insecurity afflict all parts of the country, particularly the northeast. Poverty accounts for the highest vulnerability factor, and other contributing factors include population growth and distribution, poor social infrastructure, rise in environmental degradation, low level of public awareness, weak capacity of the public sector, and the dynamics of public policy on environment.

II. Current State of National Security in Nigeria

Nigeria is currently confronted with myriads of dynamic and uncertain threats to national security that are rapidly stagnating core productive and social sectors and disrupting economic stability and growth. The prosperity of every nation rest on a stable and robust economic and financial system and their integration into the global economy, and insecurity in recent times as emerged as a critical threat to Nigeria's national and global economic interests and reputation in the international community.

For over a decade, the security situation in Nigeria has continued to be influenced by terrorism, pastoral conflict, kidnapping, armed conflict, and general crime. Attacks on farmers and farmland by herdsmen as the Sahel encroaches on pastoral areas have intensified, interstate travel has stalled due to the significant risk of kidnapping that has reached peak levels, simmering discontent across ethnic groups continue to grow, attacks on public infrastructure have escalated and drug trafficking and organized crime are growing areas of concern. The inabilities of federal and state authorities to successfully investigate and hold known perpetrators to account has depleted public trust and confidence in the judicial system. High levels of resentment and grievances within and between communities, toxic ethno-religious narratives, and "extremist" ideologies - characterised by dehumanization of the "other" has triggered widespread break down of law and order, with particularly acute consequences for the most vulnerable and impoverished populations of Nigeria.

However, the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, whose operations have assumed higher and more complex dimensions pose the biggest challenge to national security. Insurgency now cuts across cities, towns, and villages, and has led to the loss of lives, livelihood and property, and displacement of millions of people and communities. The security situation is as dire for rural dwellers as it is for urban dwellers. The live of an ordinary Nigerian citizen is now more complex with psychological and emotional trauma from the loss of livelihood and property, and rising exposure to gory sights of lifeless and mutilated bodies from mass killings.

Additionally, the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and lack of adequate social protection programs has exacerbated the economic situation and further complicated the security challenges by exposing already vulnerable groups in resource poor setting to food and public health insecurity and extreme poverty. The National Assembly, led by the Honourable Speaker Rt Honourable Femi Gbajabiamila, further recognizes the potential for these threats to Nigerian interests to escalate to regional threats given Nigeria's central economic, political, and cultural leadership role within the African continent.

However, more crucial is the urgency to mitigate the risk of Nigeria becoming a failed state, unable to provide governance, basic services, and opportunities for Nigerian citizens by harnessing possible solutions for immediate and sustained long term actions that can promote and protect the wellbeing and prosperity of the nation and its people.

III. Historical Context of National Security Challenges

Post-independence from the United Kingdom in October 1960, the civil war resulted in the loss of lives of over two million people between 1967 and 1970. Military leadership gave way to Nigeria's Fourth Republic rule following the widely monitored 1999 election. Since then, conflict in Nigeria has included an insurgency in the Niger Delta, periodic outbreaks of killings in the Middle Belt, and rising levels of violence in the Northeast. The Niger Delta conflict was deescalated in 2009 following an amnesty program for militants. However, in 2011, hundreds were killed in post-election violence across the North triggering a new and persistent form of security concerns. Violent incidents ranged from the communal, to intra-communal, inter-communal, ethnic, sectarian, political, and regional conflicts.

Political life has since been marred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. Ethnic and religious strife have been common in Nigeria. Tens of thousands of Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and intercommunal clashes in the past two decades. Ethnic, regional, and sectarian divisions often stem from issues related to access to land, jobs, and socioeconomic development, and are sometimes fuelled by political interests.

The violent Islamist sect, Boko Haram, has contributed to major breakdown of security conditions in the northeast since 2009. In the southern Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have fuelled conflict and criminality for decades. Intermittent government negotiations with local militants and an ongoing amnesty program have quieted the region, but attacks on oil and gas infrastructure surged briefly in 2016 and remain a threat to the stability of oil production. Protests in the Southeast over concerns of persistent marginalization by the government have led to clashes with security forces; In the Middle Belt, violent competition for resources between nomadic herders, largely Muslim, and settled farming communities, many of them Christian, has been on the rise in recent years and is spreading into Nigeria's southern states.

Despite extensive petroleum resources, Nigeria's human development indicators

are among the world's lowest, and much of the population faces extreme poverty. Although Nigeria is chiefly known for its oil and gas production, agriculture employs about 70 per cent of its labour force. Small holder farmers in the country's centre and south harvest most of the country's tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock. Historically, relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. By and large, they lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders' cattle would fertilise the farmers' land in exchange for grazing rights. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; violent incidents have reportedly occurred in at least 22 of the country's 36 states.

Figure 2. National Security Threats by Region



NORTH CENTRAL – Herdsmen and Farmers

Plateau state falls on the dividing line between Nigeria's mainly Christian south and mostly Muslim north and has witnessed sporadic ethnic and religious tensions for decades. The largely agrarian Christian communities in the state maintain the Muslim Fulani herdsmen are engaged in a prolonged battle to gobble up land from the areas of indigenous people. Fulani leaders counter their people face discrimination as 'foreigners' in Plateau and are deprived of basic rights, including access to land, education and political office, despite having lived in the area for generations. Tensions frequently boil over, with more than 10,000 people killed in the state since the turn of the century.

Sectarian violence continues to be a major problem in and around the central Nigerian city of Jos, the capital of Plateau State, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south. Tensions among communities

in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” are both religious and ethnic, and they stem from competition over resources - land, education, government jobs - between ethnic groups classified as settlers or as ‘indigenes’ (original inhabitants of the state), with the latter designation conveying certain political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are considered indigenes, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally nomadic and pastoralist, are viewed as the settlers.

Violent conflict between largely Muslim Fulani herders and ethnically diverse farmers in predominantly Christian areas has taken on tribal, religious, and regional dimensions. Clashes across the central belt, and spreading southward, account for 2,500 deaths annually. The conflict is now so deadly that many Nigerians fear it could become as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency. Escalating internally, the conflict could also spread regionally – herders might seek to draw fighters from their kin in other West and Central African countries, as some Fulani leaders have warned. This in turn could undermine a fragile region already struggling to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents.

Land disputes, competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. Ethnocultural and religious affiliation also were factors attributed to some local conflicts. Nevertheless, many international organizations, including International Crisis Group, assessed that these divisions were incidental to the farmer-herder conflict. During the past year, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in north-central states steadily slowed due to government policies and civil society conflict-resolution mechanisms. ‘Silent killings,’ in which individuals disappeared and later were found dead, occurred throughout the year. Conflicts concerning land rights continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.

Unmitigated climate change is a growing threat to peace and security. This is especially evident in the north-eastern region where the shrinking of Lake Chad has directly impacted livelihoods, creating food insecurity and competition over scarce resources. Additionally, it has prompted wide-scale human mobility, thereby shifting the political and economic landscape that has intensified instability in the region. It is an established fact that the consequences of climate change intersect with other political, social, and economic stresses that compound the pressures that people experience. Inevitably, these pressures exacerbate existing tensions, undermine humanitarian efforts and development gains, overturn the resiliency of communities, and threaten tenuous peace processes. Given these concerns, it is also worth noting that climate change and its attendant insecurities impact men and women differently.

NORTH-EASTERN - Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa

Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al- Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, in the 1990s. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth



wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. Most accounts date the beginning of Boko Haram – its formal Arabic name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – to 2002, when it began to attract official attention. Initially referred to as the Yusufiyya or Nigerian Taliban and later as Boko Haram, it also rejected all secular authority.

The group is more popularly known as Boko Haram (often translated as ‘Western education is forbidden’), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking communities to describe the group’s view that Western education and culture are corrupting influences that are haram (‘forbidden’) under its conservative interpretation of Islam.

In 2014 Boko Haram killed more than 4,000 people, although the true figure is almost certainly higher. In the first three months of 2015, Boko Haram fighters killed at least 1,500 civilians. The group bombed civilian targets across Nigeria, raided towns, and villages in the northeast and from July 2014 began to capture major towns. By February 2015, it controlled the majority of Borno state, as well as northern Adamawa state and eastern Yobe state. In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader, proclaimed this territory to be a caliphate. Tens of thousands of civilians were subjected to Boko Haram’s brutal rule.

Later, Mr Shekau formally pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), turning his back on al-Qaeda. IS accepted the pledge, naming the territory under Boko Haram’s control as the Islamic State of West Africa Province and a part of the global caliphate, it was trying to establish.

In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge, and the group began referring to itself as ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led the group to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram. The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria routinely call both groups Boko Haram,

with some differentiation on the 'Shekau faction' versus the 'al-Barnawi faction'. Deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2014 to 6,644.

Counterinsurgency efforts are reported to have become more effective following the inauguration in May 2015 of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari. By cutting off supply routes and targeting insurgent safe havens, the insurgents were driven from most of the territories they had previously occupied. Following their territorial losses, the insurgents reportedly changed their tactics towards asymmetric warfare, including the use of kidnapping, rape, forced recruitment of children and youth, suicide bombing, and sexual slavery. However, according to analysts a comprehensive military victory is unlikely, and the insurgents continue to pose a considerable security threat.

Boko Haram (BH) and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) continued to conduct attacks against government and security forces in the northeast, which resulted in deaths, injuries, abductions, and the capture and destruction of property. BH attacks did not appear to discriminate between civilians and government officials, whereas ISIS-WA tended to generally focus on government and security forces, while trying to cultivate stronger ties with local communities, including by providing limited social services. Nigeria continued to work with other affected neighbours under the Multinational Joint Task Force to counter-BH and ISIS-WA and regain control over territory. By the end of 2018 however, BH and ISIS-WA enjoyed nearly complete freedom of movement throughout northern Borno State and eastern Yobe State. Human rights groups documented numerous allegations of human rights violations by Nigerian security forces during counterterrorism operations. In 2018, BH and ISIS-WA carried out more than 600 to 700 attacks in Nigeria using small arms, captured military equipment, suicide bombers, IEDs, VBIEDs, ambushes, and kidnappings.

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Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centres and security personnel in Borno State. Boko Haram also conducted limited attacks in Adamawa, while ISIS-WA attacked targets in Yobe. These groups targeted anyone perceived as disagreeing with the groups' political or religious beliefs or interfering with their access to resources. While Boko Haram no longer controls as much territory as it once did, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. Both groups carried out infrequent attacks through roadside IEDs. ISIS-WA maintained the ability to carry out effective complex attacks on military positions.

NORTH-WESTERN STATES - Banditry, Kidnappings

The activities of bandits have escalated in the past two years in the North West. With occasions of kidnapping and general criminality also pervasive; it has become clear that the activities of criminal gangs need to be brought under control by the government as quickly as possible.

Populations in Northwest Nigeria are facing the ever increasing threat of banditry, a type of organized crime that includes kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape,

cattle rustling and the exploitation of environmental resources. Armed banditry has become a central security challenge to Nigeria's northwest that has terrorized communities, killed and displaced thousands, hindered socio-economic development and threatened democratic governance.

Since 2011, there has been a surge in attacks between the Fulani herdsmen and sedentary Hausa farming. This is a result of environmental and ecological changes which has caused land and water to become valuable commodities, sparking fierce and often violent competition over resources. Over the years, this banditry has evolved from a communal rivalry into lethal militia groups. The boko haram organization, aiming to expand its base beyond the northeast, has started forming alliances with some of these bandit groups in the northwest.

Informal security groups such as the vigilantes have played a crucial role in protecting the communities from these bandit groups. The federal government has also deployed police and military operations to states like Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger and Sokoto. This security response pushed back attacks, destroyed hideouts and killed and arrested hundreds of bandits. The governors of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara also secured a peace deal with these armed bandits. Despite all these measures, the insecurity challenges in the North-western states still continue.



SOUTHERN NIGERIA - Biafra, and the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region's share of oil revenues and its marginalisation in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria's oil industry, slashing earnings from its exports, the country's major revenue source. A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability, and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad

governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed. The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), the first national leader from the region, stipends and training for the former militants and arrangements with insurgency leaders kept a lid on local agitation and conflict.

Conflict in the Niger Delta has been marked by the vandalism of oil infrastructure; massive, systemic production theft locally known as 'oil bunkering,' often abetted by state officials, protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil operations, kidnapping for ransom, public insecurity and communal violence. The demands of the region's various militant groups have varied, but often include calls for greater autonomy for the region and a larger share of oil revenues. Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring international attention to the Delta's plight. Successive Nigerian governments have pledged to engage the Delta's disaffected communities, but few of their efforts met with success until 2009, when President Yar'Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants.

Other organized criminal forces in the southern and middle parts of the country committed abuses, such as kidnappings. The overall level of violence in the Niger Delta, which declined briefly after a 2009 general amnesty, rose during the year. While amnesty lasted, there was some reprieve as militants sheathed their swords. However, there has been recourse to arms in the region in recent times as new militant groups emerged in 2016 with various demands. While the new names that emerged, this time differ from the past ones, there is no doubt that this was old wine in new bottles. The new militants are still insisting on resource control and bombing of oil installations, which is re-immersing the country in conflict once again.

Militants in the Niger Delta have not launched any major attacks on oil installations since the federal government engaged the region's ethnic and political leaders in November 2019, pledging to revive infrastructure projects, clean up the polluted Ogoni environment and allow local communities to set up modular refineries. Yet the region's situation remains fragile. Attacks against Igbos or other southerners in the north might lead some delta militants to target oil companies, either to pressure the federal and northern state governments to stop anti-Igbo violence, or to cover criminal activities.

Criminal groups abducted civilians in the Niger Delta and the Southeast, often to collect ransom payments. Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. On July 13, 2020, for example, Nigerian pirates boarded a cargo vessel off the coast of Bayelsa, kidnapping 10 Turkish sailors and taking them away by speedboat. The pirates, initially demanding three million dollars as a ransom payment, reportedly released the sailors in August after weeks of negotiations.

NATIONAL SECURITY
OVERVIEW

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NATIONAL SECURITY
OVERVIEW



The Nigerian state faces intractable security challenges across the country. The Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, violent conflicts between herders and farmers/ host communities, militancy in the oil rich Niger Delta, separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), threats of an emerging secessionist movement in the Southwest, and incessant kidnappings nationwide are parts of an ever-growing epidemic of insecurity.


In the Northwest particularly, Nigeria is experiencing a crisis of armed banditry and kidnapping. These bandits are involved in killings, rape, robbery, arson, cattle rustling and displacement of communities. They operate from the Rugu and Falgore forests that traverse Kano, Katsina, Kaduna and Zamfara. Casualties are across all social categories – as men, women and children are all at risk. Indeed, the region has remarkably witnessed five separate mass kidnapping incidents since November 2020, in which between tens and hundreds of children have been captured and carted away from public school premises.

Their negotiated release has cost the government as much as USD\$2.4 million, according to sources familiar with the details, although official sources insist that no ransoms were tendered. For non-state armed groups, such payments will be used to sustain the war they have been waging against the state for over a decade. Likewise, farmers have been forced to abandon their uncultivated farmlands or to pay taxes to bandits to cultivate and harvest their own crops. Female victims (including girls) have been abducted and sexually assaulted.

This report analyses recommendations from three different dimensions:

1. National Recommendations and Solutions
2. Regional Recommendations and Solutions
3. Thematic Areas Recommendations and Solutions

Figure 3. Types of violence in 2020 by geopolitical region.



In Nigeria's Northeast, the Boko Haram insurgents remain a grievous threat to residents despite both the internal fissures within the movement and the government's frequent proclamations of victory. The Nigerian military's decision in 2019 to regroup into a smaller number of 'super camps' to fight the insurgents has reduced human and equipment losses.

However, it has also created a territorial vacuum which the armed groups utilize to move at will and launch attacks, including complex operations on well-fortified camps, as were witnessed at Marte, Dikwa, Damasak and Monguno in Borno State. The super camps have become a refuge for large numbers of internally displaced persons and humanitarian organizations providing essential services who can only work within these areas. An estimated 1 million people outside the camps remain inaccessible due to the threat of attack and kidnapping posed by the insurgents.

Southeast Nigeria has in recent times been classified as confrontation zones between the Nigerian state and non-state actors agitating for secession of Biafra from the Nigerian state. While residual demands for Biafran independence increased following the restoration of electoral democracy in 1999, these agitations intensified around 2012 with the emergence of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). IPOB grew out of the fracturing Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) around 2014, fast becoming the crux of Biafran secessionist agitation following the emergence of diasporic Igbo-nationalist radio host Nnamdi Kanu as its leader.

In December 2020, the now exiled Kanu, announced in a twitter update that IPOB established a paramilitary organisation named the Eastern Security Network (ESN). According to the tweet, the ESN aims to defend Nigeria's South-eastern states both against crime and against what Kanu termed "Fulani terrorism" and "state sponsored lawlessness". Since then, the group has had repeated confrontations with the military, resulting in several casualties that have included soldiers, police, ESN members, and civilians.

While Kanu called for a ceasefire between the group and the military in January 2021, confrontations have continued. For instance, on 18 February, military fighter jets on the invitation of the Imo state government reportedly conducted aerial airstrikes targeting an ESN base in Orlu, Imo State. Likewise, on 28 March, police claimed they had arrested 16 people, on suspicion of having played a role in the murder of 34 security agents in the south-east. The suspects confessed to being members of IPOB and the ESN according to the police. On the other hand, since the start of the year, militants have also shot police officers, raided police stations, raided correctional facilities freeing thousands of inmates, and set the Police Headquarters in Imo state on fire. The intensification of clashes between the security forces and armed groups in the Southeast is raising fears that hitherto largely dormant secessionist agitations in the Southeast are erupting into full blown armed conflict.

I. Multiple Nodes of Violent Conflict

Also occurring across the nation are the conflicts between farmers and nomadic

herders. These are primarily the result of disputes over natural resources, particularly land and water. However, given that the opposing communities largely hold separate religious creeds, clashes are often presented in the media not only as conflicts between farmers and herders but also as a confrontation between Christianity and Islam.

The ongoing unrest has had a massive human and economic cost for Nigeria. Violent incidents are now taking place across the six geopolitical zones, with the highest frequency of incidents recorded in the Northern States of Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, Borno, Benue, Taraba, Plateau, Oyo, Ondo and Adamawa. The insecurity plaguing Nigeria is rending its social fabric and generating new pressures along long-standing ethnic, religious and geopolitical fault lines.

The recurrent violence occurring in different parts of the country has led to the destruction of property, agricultural losses, and human rights violations. The proliferation of small arms in Nigeria further contributes to insecurity. A report by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) revealed that Nigeria hosts 350 million or 70 per cent of the 500 million illegal arms in West Africa.

The government's response has been to initiate military operations in all states. However, in none of Nigeria's states has this succeeded in significantly reducing insecurity. In fact, there is a growing distrust of the capacities of the security agencies, the judiciary, and the government more generally to protect citizens, ensure accountability for perpetrators of violence, discourage impunity, and address grievances. Unaddressed, lingering grievances and perceptions of injustice will remain an underlying fuel for insecurity engulfing ever increasing stretches of Nigerian territory.

This security outlook in Nigeria is further worsened by a miscomprehension, often fuelled by disinformation, among policy makers and the wider public of the critical factors triggering and sustaining varied conflicts. Public outcries following news of emerging security challenges are increasingly driven more so by sensationalist and politicized media narratives that reinforce existing stereotypes rather than by rigorous, investigative reporting aiming to inform instead of alarm.

The increasing prevalence of misinformation and disinformation across traditional and new media spheres also further deepens public anxiety and intergroup tensions without raising levels of public awareness about either the mounting insecurity or state responses to its varied forms

An atmosphere of increased public pressure spurred by poor or biased information about the complex security context contributes to knee-jerk responses from decision-makers, acting to avoid political backlash from constituents rather than address the root causes of insecurity. Meanwhile, the partial evidence base available to policy makers genuinely interested in lasting solutions to the varied security challenges also directly stymies policy responses to insecurity both at federal and state levels.

Figure 4. How fake News is fuelling insecurity.



This, in turn, leads to policy responses that are partial and unfit for purpose, serving to further deepen public anxiety rather than restore civic order and public confidence in the capacities and motivations of decision-makers. Over the past few years, lawmakers from Washington to Berlin have discussed regulating social media in one form or another. For Germany in particular, a central question has been whether such platforms should be held liable if they fail to delete or remove illegal content. That question was answered in 2018 when they enacted the Network Enforcement Act (NEA) which allows social media platforms with more than two million registered users in Germany to remove “manifestly unlawful” content within 24 hours of receiving a complaint.

In a context such as Nigeria’s, where the polity remains fragile and easily divided, which ultimately benefits social media companies that profit off the large amount of online engagement, it is necessary to define our terms of use. According to WeAreSocial, Facebook has 29 million registered Nigerian users, while Twitter has 3 million users. Considering the large user base, these platforms must be held accountable if they are used as launching pads for false content.

We know that disinformation has always been a feature of Nigeria’s social and political landscape. What is new is the speed and format of content which can be shared amongst Nigeria’s growing numbers of social media and internet users. But its influence is not simply confined to those online. Disinformation campaigns may start on social media platforms and private messenger applications like WhatsApp, but they penetrate offline spaces by influencing the outputs and programmes of conventional media and through well-established rumour networks.

Research has shown that disinformation is most effective when it draws on existing narratives and contexts to sharpen existing social and religious divides. These disinformation campaigns designed and led by Nigerians, political leaders, as well as international firms, are aimed at delegitimizing institutions, groups, or personalities, glorifying a leader or, during elections, confusing voters, instigating apathy or marginalising women and other vulnerable groups.

II. Setting the Agenda

As governments around the world demonstrate their commitment to tackling the menace of misinformation and disinformation, the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ensuing 'infodemic' has only further demonstrated the need to ensure that information shared is truthful and verified.

Nigeria came into the spotlight towards the end of 2020 with the #EndSARS protests that emerged in response to actions carried out by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigerian Police Force. Within this context, there were renewed calls for the regulation of social media. However, past attempts such as a bill which was submitted to the National Assembly, widely known as the 'antisocial media bill', revealed a need to holistically address social media regulation.

This bill drew significant criticism as detractors pointed out that rather than address disinformation, the bill would shut down legitimate efforts to expose human rights abuses and anti-democratic behaviour.

A sustainable solution to social media regulation in Nigeria should take into cognizance the potential of social media as a tool for positive social change. And that building a digital ecosystem that is democratic, with fair checks and balances requires a multi-stakeholder approach that draws from the multiplicity of solutions developed by actors in this space alongside collaboration with the social media companies themselves.

III. Overview of the Nigerian Security Architecture

The statutory responsibility of national security in Nigeria is vested in the president (the executive arm of government) through all such security agencies established by law. Nigeria's security sector comprises the following:

- > The Armed Forces
- > The Nigerian Police Service (of about 360,000 men and women)
- > Paramilitary bodies including NSCDC, Customs and Exercise, the Immigration Service, Intelligence Services – including Military Intelligence and the State Security Services.
- > Judicial and State Service Bodies – Judiciary, Justice Ministry, Correctional Service (Prison)
- > Private Security Outfits

- > Militia Groups –including, for example community vigilante groups

Constitutionally, the armed forces, police and prisons are answerable to the federal government because they are under the exclusive and legislative list. The non-formal security organizations also respond to the security needs of communities.

Figure 5. Nigeria's National Security Architecture.





The Nigerian Police Force (NPF)

The Nigerian Police Force (NPF), formerly 'the Nigerian Police', is the main law enforcement or security agency in Nigeria. The agency currently has a staff strength of about 370,000. This law enforcement agency is one of the most popular and well-known agencies in Nigeria and most citizens direct interact with its officers daily. The NPF is headed by an appointed Inspector General of Police (IGP) and consists of thirty-six (36) state commands grouped into twelve (12) zones and seven (7) administrative organs.

The functions of the Nigerian Police Force include but are not limited to:

- Prevention and detection of crime within the country
- Apprehension of offenders
- Preservation and enforcement of law and order
- Protection of life and property of citizens
- Performance of such military duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of the police act or any other act.

The State Security Service (SSS)

The State Security Service (SSS) which is popularly known as the department of State Service (DSS) is a principal security agency in Nigeria responsible for counterintelligence, as well as investigating some other types of weighty crimes in the country. The agency is also responsible for fighting insurgency, counterintelligence and provides protection for senior government officials, particularly the President who is the commander in chief of the federation, the Vice President, Senate President, their families, State governors and immediate families, past Presidents and spouses, some candidates for the offices of President and Vice President and visiting foreign Heads of State and government. The DSS is also one of three successor organisations to the now defunct National Security Organization (NSO) and is headquartered in Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory. The SSS operates as an agency under the presidency and is headed by the National Security Adviser.

Major functions of the Department of State Security Services include:

- Protecting the country against various internal security threats

- Enforcement of certain laws in the country
- Taking leading roles on issues concerning criminal justice at the federal and state levels of law enforcement
- Counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and security surveillance duties
- Protection of the President, Vice President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, State Governors, their immediate families, other high ranking government officials, past presidents and their spouses, certain candidates for the offices of president and Vice President and visiting foreign heads of state and government.



The Nigerian Armed Forces

The Nigerian Armed Forces consists of the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Army, and the Nigerian Air Force. These three branches of the Nigerian military have different functions and chains of command. The Nigerian Army is the land branch of the Nigerian armed forces and the largest of the three arms. The Nigerian Army has a staff size of around 200,000 as at 2016 and the agency is responsible for land warfare operations in Nigeria. The Nigerian Navy is the sea branch of the Nigerian armed forces and is responsible for the defence of the country's territorial waters and seas. This agency consists of the Naval Headquarters in Abuja, and three operational commands with headquarters in Lagos, Calabar and Bayelsa. The Nigerian Air Force is also one of the agencies under the Nigerian Armed Forces which is responsible for the defence of Nigeria's airspace. The agency currently has an estimated staff strength of 10,000 and is headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. The Nigerian Armed Forces are headed by the Chief of defence Staff who reports directly to the president who is also the Commander in Chief of the Nation's Armed Forces.

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

The National Intelligence Agency is one of the three successor organisations to the now defunct National Security Organisations (NSO). It is a federal agency responsible for overseeing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations in the country. This agency was formed in 1986 by Nigeria's former Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida, and is one of three agencies formed from the National

Security Organisation (NSO) with the other two being the State Security Service (SSS) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The functions of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) are roughly the same as those of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (the SIS or MI6). The agency is also headed by a director general.

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The Defence Intelligence Agency is Nigeria's primary military intelligence agency. It was established in 1986 with the sole aim of providing an efficient method of obtaining military intelligence for the Nigerian Armed Forces and the country's Ministry of Defence. This agency is headed by the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) who can be appointed or sacked by the president of Nigeria at any given time. Like the SSS, most details about this agency such as the staff population and annual budget are kept classified.

Some functions of the Defence Intelligence Agency include:

- Obtaining military intelligence for the Nigerian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence.
- Promoting Nigeria's Defence Policy.
- Enhancing military cooperation with other countries and allies.
- Protecting the lives of citizens of the federal republic of Nigeria.
- Maintaining the territorial integrity of the Nation.

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)

The NSCDC is a Nigerian paramilitary and security agency which is responsible for providing measures against threats and any form of attack or disaster against the nation and its citizens. It was established in May 1967 by the Nigerian Government and statutorily empowered by law Act No. 2 of 2003 and amended by Act 6 of 4 June 2007. This agency was first introduced in May 1967 during the Nigerian Civil War within the then Federal Capital Territory of Lagos with the main aim of sensitizing and protecting civilians living in the country. It was known as Lagos Civil Defence Committee at the time.

THE CURRENT
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Nigeria is the most insecure and least peaceful country in West Africa, consistently ranking low on the Global Peace Ranking. The National Security Summit revealed critical gaps in the current security environment, and factors that are shaping and enabling current trends in national security threats development.

I. Trends Shaping the Security Environment

Poverty and Unemployment

The continuing poverty of 40 percent of the Nigerian population, challenges of high levels of unemployment and illiteracy particularly amongst the youth, and persistent inequitable distribution of wealth compromises the country's welfare and adversely renders youth vulnerable to organised crime, violent extremism, and terrorist recruitment. Additionally, in the absence of a robust response to the adverse shocks of the COVID19 crisis and comprehensive social protection programs, the poverty rate is expected to rise, further exacerbating the current security situation.

Ethnicism and Religious Crisis

Ethnicism, tribalism and religious fanaticisms hinder national integration and have been elevated to stumbling blocks to an atmosphere of peace and harmony, security of lives and property, and freedom of thought and speech. Simmering discontent across ethnic groups and religious factions continue to grow and high levels of resentment and grievances have caused a lack of cordiality, suspicion, fear, and violent confrontations within and between communities characterised by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Fulani herdsmen attacks.

Poor Border Control

Nigeria has very porous frontiers where movement of individuals are largely untracked resulting in a continuing threat of small arms proliferation and advanced weaponry, as well as drug and human trafficking that all promote violence.




Smuggled weapons become available to militant and criminal groups and the porosity of Nigerian borders allow an influx of immigrants from neighbouring countries, including the Republic of Niger, Republic of Benin and Chad who are sometimes indoctrinated in terrorism and extremist ideologies.

Terrorism

Several militant groups have emerged, stemming from discontentment, ethnic and religious superiority, separatist agenda, and the likes. These groups, such as the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, perpetuate all forms of violence and terror – including suicide bombing, kidnapping, sabotage of oil facilities, vandalization of civilian property and critical public infrastructure – that threaten socio-economic development and national security.

Nigeria Ranks 3rd Most Impacted by Terrorism



Source: Institute for Economics and Peace
Prepared by Professor Steve H. Hanke, The Johns Hopkins University

Inefficient Government Intervention

Weak and unconsolidated governance jeopardises the stability of the Nigerian economy and Institutions. Failure of the government to offer adequate economic and social interventions and deploy decisive security strategies to curb growing threats to economic stability, peace, and prosperity has caused insecurity to thrive. In the absence of sufficient government control, crime rates continue to grow causing chaos and myriad disruptions to economic activities and daily life. Granting amnesty to the Niger Delta militants and deploying military personnel to combat Boko Haram are moves that have helped address security concerns in the past but these security challenges persist or resurface due to the lack of anticipation of future threats and long-term strategies to combat insecurity and sustain national security.

Lack of Faith in National Security Apparatus Agencies

Criminal factions appear to be better equipped with larger-capacity advanced weaponry than national security agencies. Terrorist groups often engage in other criminal operations including kidnapping for ransom to fund the procurement of assault weapons. Expertise, technical and operational capabilities of security agencies are lacking due to insufficient training opportunities and several security personnel join the armed forces to escape poverty and employment rendering them vulnerable to corruption, and lack of robust and prompt response to civilian calls for protection has diminished the confidence of Nigerian citizens in security institutions.

Corrupt and Vested Interests

Corruption is increasingly associated with political authorities in Nigeria. The misappropriation of public funds has become a norm. In bid to gain or stay in power, some of government officials fund terrorist groups evidenced by the political undertone of activities of major terrorist groups. Gubernatorial candidates mostly, have been known to recruit armies of political thugs and engage in clandestine and illegal efforts during election periods to facilitate election violence and shape election outcomes.

Use of thugs and violence by the Political Elite

Since 1999, there has been several reports and cases of politicians arming thugs and unemployed youth for election purposes. The sad pattern is that after elections, these thugs are left with the weapons given to them to prosecute electoral victory. Many took to criminality all across the country. These youth and thugs are now largely outside the control of the politician who created them and have become a menace to society.

Imbalance in Development

The disparity in development of regions of the country is one of the major causes of insecurity in Nigeria. There is a feeling of partiality and marginalization amongst some ethnic groups in Nigeria due to the imbalance in development across geopolitical zones. This causes dissatisfaction and grievance in the people occupying such regions and triggers the employment of violence to get the attention of the government. National debt obligations are at peak levels and the



imperative to sustain national security competes with government's obligation to also channel resources to provide other public goods such education and healthcare infrastructure resulting in a trade-off that could have adverse implications on the security environment.

Loss of Communal Value and National Identity Systems

History bears record of a time when the traditional value system of the Nigerian society, as multi-ethnic as it is, was characterized by collectivism, loyalty to local authority and community, hard work, mutual harmony and coexistence, abhorrence for theft, and high value for life. A time when guns were meant for hunting animals and cutlasses or machetes for farming. Most of these communal values which made society safe and made citizens feel secure have been lost gradually over time and since the penetration of western culture. In the face of these loss and non-prioritisation of a reliable identify system, economic growth and development and national security cannot be sustained.

II. Factors Enabling Current Insecurities

Overlapping Mandates

Collapse in national security has revealed structural weaknesses in the national security institutions and have created an enabling environment for insecurity to thrive.

Nigeria has the largest security institution in Africa comprising of twenty-one (21) security agencies in charge of policing and security. Several agencies have duplicated roles with jurisdiction over the same security matters, contravening the purpose they are established to serve and rendering them largely ineffective at best and inactive at worst. These vast silos have created a crisis making it difficult to claim ownership. Take for instance while several policing related agencies have been created such as the NSCDC, EFCC, FRSC and NDLEA, the constitutional power of the Nigerian Police Force over all crimes is still undiminished.


It is this jurisdictional encroachment that prompted the NSCDC, few years ago to sue the NPF on the grounds that they impinged on their authority to carry out their legitimate duties to protect national oil pipelines. To resolve this, a proactive measure in rationalizing agencies should be desperately considered in Nigeria. It is suggested that rather than creating more agencies that continue to duplicate and perform the functions of the existing security arms, the focus should turn to securing the internal and external integrity and security of existing security

institutions in Nigeria

Regional Spread of Insurgency

There is seemingly a build-up of insurgency and it's a looming threat on the west coast of Nigeria from Mali to Burkina Faso and Togo. Figure 6 illustrates the spread of insurgency in the Sahel and highlights the rising threat of further penetration of terrorist groups into Nigeria with Togo, Ghana and Benin as likely new targets. Nigeria must urgently strengthen her western border from Sokoto to Lagos

Figure 6. The Regional Spread of Insurgency.



Source: Armed Conflict & Event Data Project: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Maritime Safety Information

Lack of Synergy

The security situation in Nigeria has continued to deteriorate due to the perceived lack of neutrality and professionalism on the part of security agencies. The obvious lack of synergy in operations and intelligence sharing among security agencies has fuelled insecurity nationwide. Poor cooperation between the Executive and Legislative arms undermines good governance and service delivery leading to a lack of cooperation between security agencies.

The absence of harmonised operations between the Police, Military, Department of State Security and National Intelligence Agency has made it difficult to effectively check banditry, terrorism, and other forms of criminality, enabling the growing trajectory of insecurity in the country.

Environment and Climate Change

Climate disruption is a crisis amplifier and multiplier (Guterres, 2020). While climate change dries up rivers, diminishes harvests, destroys critical infrastructure, and displaces communities, it is also exacerbating the risks of instability and conflict. Environment degradation and climate vulnerability can be directly linked to insecurity.

The adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, including desertification, land degradation, deforestation enable high levels of insecurity in Nigeria. This resource degradation resulting from climate change leads to poverty, food insecurity, migration and eventually conflict and insecurity. The shrinking of the Lake Chad in the Northeast region has severely cut down agricultural activities and provided breeding ground for terrorist camps. It has directly impacted livelihoods, creating food insecurity and competition over scarce resources.

It is also worth noting that climate change and its attendant insecurities impact men and women differently. Women, youth, and children are usually the most adversely affected by climate insecurity. Climate related emergencies could result in disruptions to public health and climate related migration increase the risk of gender-based violence.

The Role of Politics and Politicians in Fuelling Insecurity

The Collins Dictionary defines politics as *“the activities involved in getting and using power in public life, and being able to influence decisions that affect a country or society”*. This is that which relates to the state, government, the body politics, public administration, policy-making in a nation.”(Collins 2005).






In Nigeria there have been various factions with various political ambitions many which are based on the wrong reasons. Many politicians who constantly criticize the government do so for wrong reasons. The desire for a political office and the various perceived benefits that come with a political office is resulting in many politicians in Nigeria willing to do anything to attain it. There have been various aspersions by perpetrators of the violent activities in parts of the country to be the result of a hidden agenda of politicians. Various politicians have been quoted on different occasions uttering words which heat up the polity for selfish gains. They have the intention of enthroning their own type of government which is usually selfish, criminal and unpatriotic as Nigerians. In order to achieve these ambitions many politicians inadvertently push their agenda which may eventually lead to making the country ungovernable or insecure. Politicians constantly try to take advantage of various opportunities and protests to hijack the main purpose of these events and inflict further pains on an impoverished population which continues to increase insecurity in the Nation; either through their utterances or the use of various actors mentioned earlier to achieve their aims. Once they attain office they sometimes abandon these actors who now become nuisances leading to further insecurity in their various communities. A former Army chief, General Tukur Buratai warned in May 2019 in a public statement that troops should steer clear of politicians approaching them for “undisclosed political reasons” further raising fears of military intervention in pockets of the country seen as being dissident. It is clear therefore that Politicians have played a role in enabling the current insecurity in Nigeria and leadership needs to address the conduct of these politicians who many a times have a huge following and inadvertently stoke up the heat in communities.

Nigerian Politicians have had a long history of being at the root of corrupt practices, bribery and embezzlement. This has led to the poor state of infrastructure and social development, as monies are diverted for selfish and personal interest. This has led to poverty, moral decadence, human capital deficit and also a lack of appropriate security equipment thus compounding the state of insecurity in the nation.

III. Issues Fuelling Insecurity in the Northeast

Peak insecurity in the Northeast is the greatest threat to socio-economic development and national stability in Nigeria. The conflict in the Northeast has redistributed economic and political power across sectors, actors, and geographies. The conflict economy in the North East is diverse and evolving.

Figure 7. Corruption and Insecurity



With hardcore extremist elements retaining influence and the ability to conduct raids and attacks on civilians, the risk of unpredictable violence remains high as the conflict continues. Violence has led to a re-organisation of economic and geographic spaces, progressively entrenching a divide between 'communities of the lake' and 'communities of the river' and causing the displacement of cattle herders and livestock resources away from Borno.

ISWAP is gaining a reputation for being more pragmatic and predictable and following the killing of Shekau, the leader of JAS, not much is known of how the faction will evolve. However, it is presumed that the Bakura faction will continue as a purely predatory entity.

Insecurity has however enriched a minority who are benefiting from the current situation, including corrupt high-ranking military officers and traffickers. Within the military, evidence indicates endemic corruption at top and mid-levels, and illicit trafficking and abuse of civilians among a largely dysfunctional, depressed, and ineffective rank and file. This has the potential to further alienate the local population and strengthen support for their adversary.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VOEs) and security actors seem to expand their power, and mid- to low-level officers can access new legal and illegal opportunities for enrichment, while many in the ranks struggle. VEOs who are involved in every productive primary sector raise revenue through illicit taxation, raiding and kidnapping.

IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULACE

Forced Dispossession and Sharing of Agricultural Produce

Bullying, confiscation, and effective stealing of harvests is common practice, without available judicial recourse for locals. This activity is often justified by military who claim perpetrators are Boko Haram members or sympathisers ferrying produce to the group. These groups are also believed to intimidate and threaten produce sellers with sexual violence.

Forced Dispossession and Use of Farmland

There is considerable reporting indicating that several groups have participated in the expropriation of farmland in newly recovered areas and that this is subsequently being used for growing crops for commercial use

Exploitation of Labour

The use of local labour, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), to farm illegally acquired land or to undertake other agrarian work for low daily rates is common practice.

PRACTICES WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES FUELLING INSECURITY

Procurement Practices

Poor procurement practices result in sub-quality equipment and munitions being allotted to parts of the Nigerian Army. This overt nature of corruption in the procurement process at the most senior levels appears to be less egregious than prior to 2015, but the overall procurement system in Nigeria is still viewed by many as corrupt and, to a large extent, unaccountable. Procured ammunition, for example, is often expired and quantities available for operations are considerably below what is required, and the Nigerian Army soldiers find themselves outgunned by Boko Haram as a direct consequence. Rifles are reportedly jammed after single shots, armour support is obsolete and not fit for purpose, bombs used by the Nigerian Air Force do not detonate and date back to the 1960s, surveillance tools are either missing or not deployed, even new and correct uniforms are rarely procured.

Weapons purchased are often refurbished and some date back to the 1967 civil war. It is estimated that the Boko Haram has fifty times more munition strength than the Nigerian Armed Forces. Multiple military personnel report that Boko Haram has more advanced weaponry than the Army while open-source imagery analysis indicates that many weapons used by Boko Haram are stolen from Nigerian, Cameroonian and Nigerian Army. Recent images suggest that other sources of weapons exist, possibly linked to criminal networks. It is alleged that soldiers have been caught supplying stocks of arms and ammunition owned by the Nigeria Armed Forces to criminal elements.

Ghost Personnel

There continues to be reporting of 'ghost soldiers', whereby individuals exist on paper – often in order that allowances get paid – but not co-opted. Battalions were often understrength, with only 500 soldiers out of an 800 complement, it is

estimated that a nominal 800-strong battalion would have just about 300-400 soldiers.

Inadequate Welfare Provisions and Protections

Military families are widely known to live in deplorable conditions. The welfare of member of the Armed Forces and their families is overlooked, this is especially the case for wounded personnel. Officers reportedly pay for their own healthcare in hospitals. Family entitlement provisions are not paid or, if they are, are not provided in a timely manner. The wellbeing of military families is essential for efficient and effective discharge of duty and the lack of welfare impacts negatively on morale and motivation and renders soldiers vulnerable to corrupt practices.

Illegal Intelligence Sharing

It is also widely reported that some terrorist groups have infiltrated national security institutions and the government. Members of the Nigerian Armed Forces and wider security and public sector structures have been found to sell information to Boko Haram or their collaborators, including sharing advance notice of raids, withholding key intelligence information, and influencing operational practices to delay military action.



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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS FROM
THE NATIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT
AND INTERNATIONAL LEADING PRAC-
TICE FROM OTHER CLIMES

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I. Local and Community Level Security: Options and Solutions

Across the world and in many countries, local governance is fundamental to the organisation of social, political, and economic life. As such, it can be considered as the first social contract that people experience. When the citizenry is connected to the representatives of the state, community-based approaches to security can contribute to improved state-society relationships and increased state legitimacy.

Community-based approaches to security and justice also possess the potential to help strengthen the links between formal and informal systems. The importance of improving the confidence of communities, along with their relationship to other communities and authorities, increases the contribution to these communities' resilience to violence. Similarly, supporting the ability and opportunity for civil society to engage in issues around conflict and security builds and reinforces important 'capacities for peace' within conflict-affected or fragile societies.

This section of the report looks at a summary of the local and community level security options and solutions discussed during the Special Summit on National security and the submissions received from various stakeholders and contributors prior to the summit. The recommendations surveyed in this report identifies tangible results in relation to informing national policy development; improving coordination between national and international security actors; enhancing local governance; improving trust between communities and security providers; redistributing resources to meet community needs; increasing civil society capacity to inform the work of security providers; building trust between social groups; empowering women and improving their experience of safety and security; mobilising youth to address security issues; and contributing to increased earning potential for poor and marginalised populations within the current Nigerian context of insecurity discussed in the earlier sections of the report.

It is important to always note when designing community-based approaches to security to clearly define what results the society is looking to achieve at this level. Clearly articulating the results sought at this level as part of a wholistic solution that clearly addresses the underlying policy and structural issues driving conflict and insecurity nationwide must be considered. The ultimate changes sought should contribute to capable, accountable, and responsive security and justice provision, along with empowered citizenry, the development of broader state-society relations and a strengthening of the social contract within societies.

Approaches to improving local and community level security should involve making sustainable improvements to people's experiences of safety and security. Solutions should cover both the end state – where communities feel more safe and secure – and the process by which communities are helped to identify and work with others to address their own security needs. Community security initiatives are at the heart of developing national security solutions and can be used to tackle a range of security problems, from gender-based violence and crime, a lack of trust between communities and security providers, to inter-ethnic tensions or weapons proliferation.

These issues are currently impacting today's Nigerian communities leading to

agitations in the Niger Delta, community clashes in Southern Kaduna and more recently clashes across the East, North Central and the North-eastern parts of the country. Whilst developing these solutions it is important to note that people live integrated lives in which security concerns such as crime, violence, intimidation, and disorder are often intimately linked to broader 'human security' issues related to economic and social indicators, for example people's health, education, and livelihoods.

Consequently, community security interventions must be equally integrated to adequately address those concerns. The rural areas in Nigeria have become notorious with all kinds of crime. Inadequate amenities such as good roads and communication infrastructure in rural areas in Nigeria have made it difficult for the Nigeria Police to effectively detect and prevent crimes in rural Nigeria. Findings from a recent study conducted by the landmark University of Nigeria, indicated that high theft cases are common crime in rural Nigeria.

Youths were observed to constitute greater percentage of suspects at police stations for crime; this could be due to the demographics of the Nigerian society. Unemployment and poverty among the rural populace especially youths were responsible for these criminalities. The absence of social infrastructure, inadequate police presence and government support to unemployed youths made the crime situations worse in rural areas. There was low level of community interactions with the police in crime prevention and control in rural Nigeria.



"We can easily separate them by engaging them. Draw them closer. If we engage the people that are active, it will be a lot easier for us. On this note, I want to thank the organisers and I want to tell us that enough of talking the talk, let us walk the talk"

– **His Royal Highness, The Ooni of Ife** (2021, National Security Summit)



"Unless we come together and look at the greater figure which is Nigeria and work for the country to move forward, we will continue having these problems."

– **His Royal Highness, The Sultan of Sokoto** (2021, National Security Summit)



"A patriotic commitment devoid of any political or sectional interest or sentiments to overcoming crime neither knows any political party, their rich nor the poor"

– **His Royal Majesty, Eze, Dr. Cletus I. Ilomuanya** (2021, National Security Summit)

The Role of Traditional Institutions in Security Management

Precolonial and during the colonial era, traditional and religious institutions played a very important role in security in the local communities, security was every body's business and to this end the Chieftains, family, schools, and religious bodies all played a role in security management. In recent times many of these institutions no longer play their expected roles in security management because of constitutional provisions and the changing times. One of the key recommendations from the summit proposes that legislation and amendment of the constitution

should provide roles for these institutions in security management.

It is therefore imperative to go back to those times and the existing structures used to socialize members of the community on their roles and expected security awareness and actions in the community. Crime reporting to local leaders, family heads and the police should be made to become a way of life by all. A return to the traditional role of traditional institutions in security management is the way forward and should be considered a priority. *(See the section on Compendium of recommendations collated from stakeholders)*


i. Community Security Solutions: Ensuring that interventions are appropriate to the context is essential for community security work, therefore there is no one size fits all solution or template of community security programming which applies across all contexts. Instead, any solution to community security should be developed in line with a set of principles and objectives applied with careful consideration of the differing realities of each context. The overarching vision of community security, the approaches and methodology for achievement and how each community will adopt it should be sensitised with all the appropriate stakeholders. The approach needs to give priority to locations where perceptions of insecurity are high, where the community, local government and police agree is priority and where there are no other similar projects (to avoid duplication).

The security and maintenance of law and order are not the responsibility of the state alone. The solution for community policing should embrace non-state actors, namely vigilantes, hunters, key stakeholders in the community like professionals, trade unions, under one umbrella of community security governance. To legitimise this arrangement, there is a need for state and local government enactments. This effort should include security enforcement, local justice system, and conflict management. A return to the local community system where the component of security, local justice system, peacebuilding and conflict management takes hold.

The local governments need to hold focus group discussions with community members, including separated discussions for groups of youth and women, to identify local security concerns. Key informant interviews should also be conducted with individuals from the local authorities, police and civil society groups with findings validated with these same stakeholders. Community Safety Working Groups (CSWG) used to exist in Nigeria as informal structures and as a mechanism for community members, local authorities, and police to come together and discuss local security issues. CSWGs should be set-up with local chieftains alongside a representative selection of community members, including men, women, youth, thus establishing a dialogue with these actors from the outset. The CSWGs should meet around once a month to monitor the implementation of community action plans, discuss issues and plan future activities.

ii. Early Warning Mechanism: At the community level, an early warning system should be established and connected to an effective response system. There is a need to improve local government authority to enable it to perform its functions effectively. There should also be local government autonomy.

iii. Developing A Strong National Identity within Communities: Communities should have strong national identity and address traditional grievances. Tools for addressing traditional grievances should include dialogue, negotiations, mediation, and inclusiveness. Additionally, concerted effort should also be made to instil traditional values, norms, and practices as a means of community social order.



THE GAMBIAN CASE: Human Rights Violations

To address human rights violations, the Gambian government under the leadership of President Barrow established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The purpose of the TRC is to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, provide closure for those affected by human rights violations, help the government establish and document an accurate historical record of events and pay reparations to victims. The commission is charged with examining records, documents and information from credible sources including former government workers. Commission members visit sites where bodies have been buried and crimes were alleged to have been committed. Once most of this evidence is gathered, they interview witnesses. The commission promotes healing and reconciliation by participating in events that foster forgiveness and healing and create national dialogue and peace building. The hearings of the commission are televised on live television, radio, and YouTube to ensure transparency of all processes.

Additionally, the government formulated a plan that consists of efforts to improve the rule of law and address grievances of the past through a transitional justice process. Following decades of bad governance, the Barrow administration appears dedicated to regaining trust of the population and strengthening the country's institutions. The administration conducted a comprehensive review of existing criminal justice legislation to reform laws restricting political and civic freedoms, particularly those of freedom of expression, and the government plans to establish more courthouses and ensure that judges and magistrates that can work full time in rural areas, where justice is often difficult to administer and access. The aim of this is to make people more aware of their rights.

Furthermore, several women and youth organisations have helped to deepen the

resiliency of local communities that have encountered and experienced conflict. For instance, the #GambiaHasDecided youth social movement was created to ensure respect of the people's voice through election results. This group played a crucial role in educating Gambians on their rights as voters and opening space for political debate. This group has managed to diffuse protests and demonstrations.



THE BURUNDI CASE: Mediation and Conflict Resolution

To prevent the return to civil war or genocide, local organisations emerged such as the Women Network for Peace and Dialogue which consists of 534 mediators who work across all municipalities in Burundi promoting non-violence and dialogue. The group succeeded in preventing widespread panic by countering rumours and fears with verifiable information, engaged early warning and proactive mediatory technics to diffuse tensions, and act as mediators to leverage inbuilt capabilities for peace and work to strengthen the resiliency of local institutions.

II. Strategic Kinetic National Security Solutions



“Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of production and per capital income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public services and chronic unemployment has a false sense of security.”

– **McNamara (1968)**

There have been several instances in the history of Nigeria where kinetic solutions have been deployed successfully. The most notable use of kinetic force began in 2012 when Boko Haram started staging coordinated attacks on military and civilian targets across northern Nigeria, including near-weekly suicide bombings in major population centres. In response to these attacks, President Goodluck Jonathan, in May 2013, declared a state of emergency in three Northeast states—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The national government in turn assembled a Joint Task Force (JTF) of Military, Police and Customs Officers to battle Boko

Haram. The government simultaneously committed to an increase in defence spending from USD\$800 million to USD\$5.4 billion between 2009 and 2014.

The JTF mission, however, hasn't been as successful as envisaged and there has been a lot of criticism based on indiscriminate arrests, torture, and extra-judicial killings of suspected Boko Haram sympathizers and members. A good example was the operation in Baga, in the Northeast state of Borno, reports claimed that the JTF members destroyed more than 2,000 buildings, reportedly in retaliation for the killing of a soldier by Boko Haram insurgents. The JTF's hard-line approach has, at best, been ineffective. Some have argued that it has been counterproductive. The frequency and intensity of Boko Haram attacks has thus grown exponentially from 2013 to date with increasing numbers and increased raids on communities which has resulted in more women and children been abducted and recruited into the group. Some notable areas for consideration for improvement in Kinetic warfare addressed include:

- i. Police Reform – Strengthening Mobile Police: the mobile police should be strengthened to undertake law and order as specified in their mandate.
- ii. Police Special Forces: should be reformed to effectively perform the role of combating issues like banditry, kidnapping, armed robbery etc.
- iii. Refocusing of Police Personnel: all personnel performing non-regimental duties should be recalled and directed towards the core mandate of policing.
- iv. National Peacebuilding Opportunities: the Legislature and the security agencies should build consensus on the definitions of security challenges from a national perspective. The incorporation of traditional and religious institutions in a continuous dialogue on national issues as a platform for conflict management. To ensure that no religious or ethnic coloration should be attached to criminality. Neither should ethnic groups be encouraged to pursue ethnic agenda.
- v. Re-Engineering Nigerian Military for Asymmetric Warfare: it was made clear at the summit that the Nigerian military does not have a coherent doctrine for asymmetric warfare, nor has it built strong strategies for fighting the war against insurgency.
- vi. Political Leaders Must Insist on The Military Producing Strategies and Doctrines for the Present and Future Wars: such doctrines should resolve the issue of interagency rivalry and appropriate deployment of equipment. Equipping the military should be based on these strategies and doctrines.
- vii. Special Forces Units: should be created and well equipped to carry out military operations of unconventional nature.
- viii. Border Security: A strong border security command structure should be established to take care of the porous borders of Nigeria.
- ix. To restructure Nigerian armed forces along a combat command system such

that each theatre of war would have its own complete assets, namely, aircraft, helicopters, and other gumboots.

x. Special attention should be paid to cyber warfare. To this end, a cyber security command should be established within the military or intelligence agencies.

xi. All duties of civil nature in the military should be manned by civilians.

xii. The military is not specifically trained for internal security. This specialisation should be seeded completely to the police. However, the military should be prepared to support humanitarian services in terms of relief materials, disaster management, in support of the civil authority.

xiii. The use of retired officers and soldiers to complement military operations is very important. There are two options, either through a reserved system, or the establishment of private military companies. In this way, experienced military personnel can be engaged to support national security.

xiv. Reporting Channels:

- The current situation whereby each Service Chief reports directly to the President is untidy, leaving little or no room for cooperation, collaboration, and coordination. The constitution should be amended to ensure that the Chief of Defence Staff is the head of the Armed Forces, who coordinates the three services and reports to the Commander in Chief.
- Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA): The ONSA should serve as the secretariat of the National Security Council, coordinating all activities of national security and providing appropriate advice to the President. This office should not be exclusive to the military to have balanced advice to the President.
- Procurement process should be under firm control of the civil authority. Due consideration should be given to local manufacturers of defence industries.
- Defence industries corporations should be strengthened and encouraged to engage in local production of weapons and equipment. And in some cases, provide local content to manufactured military equipment
- Security at the Gulf of Guinea: An establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Force has become necessary in view of the piracy, proliferation of arms, and the protection of the maritime economic zone.
- Funding: A window should be created for public support in defence funding. A security support fund should be created under the authority of the National Assembly to harness funds from private companies and well-meaning Nigerians.

xv. The Nigerian state should embark upon more people centred security than state' centric security.

xvi. There is a need to establish a National War Council where all stakeholders including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defence Interior are all included. A situation room should be established at the presidency, where the President will receive a daily situation report on security in the country.

xvii. Overlapping Mandates: There are certain agencies engaged in duties of police nature, such as the Federal Road Safety, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corp should all be collapsed into the Nigerian police with the specialised unit created for such purposes.

xviii. The Nigerian military and the Nigerian Police Force should have strict separation between military duties and police duties. Similarly, all services involved in roadblocks should be streamlined to avoid multiplication of roadblocks

xix. Technology Options and Solutions for National Security Development: There is a need to apply modern technology in warfare. Such modern technologies include the use of drones for surveillance and locating positions. It includes attack drones and satellite imagery. This modern technology may need to come under a command which may be referred to as space command. This could be created under the supervision of the Air Force.

xx. Building a Modern Intelligence Architecture: There are numerous intelligent units in the various services. The information generated resides with these intelligent agencies without being shared. This has become inimical to national security objectives and purposes. Therefore, there is a need for an intelligence command and control centre where all information is fed into for use by all the security agencies as required. See comprehensive list of recommendations in section 6.



THE SOMALI CASE: Coordinated Use of Kinetic Solutions

Despite numerous efforts and programs, Al-Shabaab and ISIS continues to be a threat to peace and security and security in Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa. Given this reality, the Somali government and other troop-contributing countries were compelled to deploy complex strategies, and to engage in a shadowy fight against violent extremism. They utilized the following means:

- Drone assassinations, which often inadvertently killed innocent civilians
- Targeted attacks on Al-shabaab
- Defence against Al-shabaab attacks.

Worth noting is the advent of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. It provides high level of regional involvement and support in addressing Somalia's political and security vacuum. Nevertheless, the deployment and sustainment of AMISOM requires multi-layered international partnerships among which are the United States, United Nations, European Union, African Union, and key troop providing countries including: Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia. The withdrawal of the AMISOM troops is yet to be determined. For more on this, see Jason Hartwig: how to end the civil war in Somalia: negotiate with Al-Shabaab.

III. Global Perspectives to Insecurity and International Factors in National Security Solutions

Across the world in recent times, tactical, organizational, and strategic national security discourse has shifted from traditional warfare to contemporary and complicated warfare. The modern trend of terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed international networks of terrorist groups with religious or ideological undertone. The attack of the New York twin towers on September 11, 2001, in the United States by al-Qaeda has been recorded as the deadliest in the modern era of international terrorism. Radical religious groups are adopting religion as a pretext to pose threats to nations around the world. The regional and international security pacts signed recently offer hope to ending the insurgencies in Nigeria. The African Union, the United States, and the European Union have pledged support to Nigeria and other African nations in the fight against terrorism. However, in recent times across the west coast of Africa there is a brewing crisis that is impacting Nigeria and many neighbouring countries including Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, and Central African Republic. Ongoing crises in these countries has further exacerbated the insecurity in Nigeria and has been further compounded by other factors including desertification, climate change, bad governance, and porous borders.

The effect has resulted in farmer pastoralist clashes, cattle rustling, rural banditry, proliferation of arms and drug trafficking in the border regions of Nigeria. In a similar vein, series of ethno-religious crises have brewed in various cities during the 1980s and 2000's in Nigeria which have undoubtedly been linked to activities of foreign nationals with links to international sponsors. Such sectarian crises were

experienced in Kano especially the Maitatsine phenomena in 1980's, Kaduna in 1987 and in the last decade, Katsina (1991), Maiduguri (1982-2007), Yola (1984), Bauchi (1991, 2000, 2002, 2009), Kafanchan (1987), Gombe (1985), Tafawa Balewa (1991), Zaria (1992), Zango Kataf (1992), Funtua (1993), Potiskum (1994), Nassarawa (2005), Taraba (2006), Shagamu in Ogun (1999), Lagos (1999-2000), Jos (2001 till today).

Nigeria needs to make a concerted effort to protect its borders, reduce desertification and better manage the pastoralist communities traversing the country. Effective counterterrorism measures involve a series of reactions to deal with different forms of terrorist threats. It requires intelligence gathering about the terrorists to prevent terrorist attacks, disrupting the financial resources used to support terrorism, degrading the Sects capacity through force, regional collaborative efforts and a socio-economic approach which would involve tackling youth unemployment to prevent the youth from being recruited as terrorists, working with other nations to curb terrorist network, as well as arresting and prosecuting the terrorists.

Lessons from other climes has shown that results-oriented counterterrorism measures often include economic sanctions on nations sponsoring terrorism or allowing terrorist to operate in their territory and the use of military as the last option. However, counterterrorism would require absolute public support against the terrorist acts to achieve success.

In the early part of 1960s, there were no recognized religion terrorist gangs, but by the 1990s almost one quarter of the world's active terrorist groups were inspired by their religious beliefs. The number of terrorist acts committed by such groups has increased and estimated to be responsible for more than half of the 64,319 recorded incidents that occurred between 1993 and 1998. The question remains what effective mechanism can be developed to combat this transnational problem to which modern states are extremely vulnerable. The intensification of counter-terrorism measures within the country, as well as seeking the support and collaboration of the international community, would go a long way in combating the menace of terrorism. Key recommendations from the summit include:

- i. Improvements in strong border security and strengthening the Nigerian Immigration Service.
- ii. Control of proliferation of arms through the establishment of a small and light weapons commission as recommended by ECOWAS.
- iii. Increase the use of technology to protect the Nigerian porous borders.
- iv. Get the support of the Great Green Wall as recommended by the African Union (AU).
- v. Partnerships with neighbouring countries, development partners and international countries such as the US and France, which already have strong

military presence in the sub-region should be strengthened.

vi. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be more proactive in strengthening the partnership with neighbours, especially CEN-SAD member countries for the security of the sub-region.

vii. The Multinational Joint Task Force should be strengthened and properly coordinated to achieve its mandate. There is a need for a strong legislative oversight function on the Multinational Joint Task Force.

viii. The Federal, State and Local Governments should collaborate to embark on development programmes in the ungoverned spaces, especially the Lake Chad basin.

ix. Nigeria should implement the ECOWAS protocols on transhuman and the National Livestock Transformation Plan.

x. Strengthening the Agro-rangers security outfit established to secure investments in agriculture. See comprehensive list of recommendations in section 6.

The Case of the African States in The Great Lakes Region and The Horn of Africa: Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons Expansion/Proliferation

To curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia signed a declaration in Nairobi in 2000 to step up the fight against illicit arms. This declaration birthed The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (RECSEA) which is an intergovernmental organization. This Centre has the mandate to build the capacity of its member states, and coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol within the RECSEA Region. RECSEA exists as the only internationally recognized inter-governmental organization within Africa with the sole mandate to address the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW). Additionally, the centre is responsible for coordinating joint efforts by National Focal Points in member states to combat stockpiling and illicit trafficking of arms. Member states jointly track the circulation of arms to rein in culprits, harmonised their crime laws to effectively combat cross border movement of illicit arms, and these countries are also exploring identical penalties for culprits as a deterrent measure.

IV. Non- Military and Non-Kinetic Security Options and Solutions

Developing countries struggle with stability in government, infrastructure, and overall economic stability, which causes the country to be vulnerable and susceptible to insurgent attacks. As a result, it is important to understand that to form a more stable government, the people must agree and identify with the developmental process. During this stage of uncertainty, insurgency is often rampant, covering the host nation in a blanket of corruption and social unrest.

The environment created by the presence of the insurgents allows them to thrive, pushing the country they invaded closer to irretrievable destruction. Defeating the insurgency becomes a pre-requisite to establish a legitimate government in the eyes of the people and surrounding nations. Among the causes of insecurity in Nigeria today is hunger, unemployment, and poverty. One non-kinetic approach to solving the issue of insecurity is food security. The Nigerian government should embark on policies and programmes that ensure food security, employment, and infrastructure development. Such programmes could include mechanised farming and an enabling environment for agriculture, soft loans for farmers, land allocations, and establishment of a vibrant value chain to include economic corridors to increase trade, marketing, transportation, and off takers. Stakeholders, during the National Security Summit, suggested that:

- i. Control of narcotics through proper regulations and enforcements can reduce the abuse of drugs that can lead to insecurity.
- ii. The National Assembly should not legalise the use of cannabis. Legalising cannabis is a trend in some developed countries that should not be encouraged in Nigeria as it fuels insecurity.
- iii. There is a need to cultivate a national identity. To achieve this, we need comprehensive economic, educational, and social safety net policies and a strong post conflict management structure.
- iv. The effective communication and cultural reorientation can help build peace and security.
- v. Social media, if not properly managed, can constitute threats to security through fake news and inciteful messaging. Therefore, strong legislation controlling social media is necessary.
- xi. The use of cash transactions aids ransom taking and other criminalities. Therefore, cash transactions should be reduced to the minimum. Introduction of a Nigerian Value System Code to encourage patriotism, which is the bedrock of social cohesion, low crime rate, sustainable economic growth, and technological development. *(See comprehensive list of recommendations in section 6)*



THE AFGHANISTAN CASE: Addressing Terrorism, Violent Conflicts and War Through Mediation

Following the announcement of a phased U.S military drawdown, the Taliban signed an agreement with the U.S government to sever ties with terrorist groups by denying them a haven as the basis for initiating peace talks among Afghan warring parties. While this process is ongoing, the Crisis Group proposed twelve steps that can bolster the prospects for sustaining intra-Afghan talks. These proposals can potentially be utilised in ensuring the success of the recommendation on dialogue with non-state actors:

- Confirm one location as the venue for talks, with a host that can play an effective facilitating role.
- A neutral mediator or group of mediators should be designated.
- The structure of the negotiations must be pre-decided on.
- The “rules of the road” or rules of engagement must be established.
- Identify easily agreed-upon principles early and build on that foundation.
- Patience and persistence must be maintained.
- technical assistance must always be made available.

THE KENYAN CASE: Tackling Root Causes of Extremism and Insurgency

The Kenyan government has taken an aggressive approach to countering extremism at home and abroad. As terrorist forces have grown in strength, the central government in Nairobi has invested more resources to disrupt terrorist financing and thwart their operations. In April 2015, the Kenyan government began the construction of a wall along Kenya’s Somali border to keep out al-Shabaab militants and illegal immigrants resulting in border attacks being lowered to “almost zero” according to the Northeast Regional Commissioner Mohamud Saleh. Kenyan police also raided Islamic schools in Mombasa,

arresting two to four teachers and taking 100 students into protective custody. The claim, according to authorities, is that the children were being indoctrinated into extremist Islamist ideology.

THE SOMALI CASE: Addressing Extremism Using Public Policy Instruments and Institutions



"The only way we can combat extremism is to listen to different perspectives particularly the religious leaders and address this problem from a Somali perspective"

– The Deputy Prime Minister, Mahdi Mohamed Guled

Somalia's continuous conflicts orchestrated mainly by Al-Shabaab insurgents, largely influenced by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have debilitated the state in multiple ways, from loss of lives, the destruction of properties and infrastructure, and a near collapse of state institutions. To deal with the challenges posed by violent extremism, the Somali government developed policies, notably, the National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in September 2016 under the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS). The CAS acknowledges that the root causes of radicalization and extremism is linked to the absence of economic opportunities for young people. The objectives of the PCVE include:

- Undertaking deradicalization programs, civic education, rehabilitation and reintegration, and strategic communication.
- Strengthening research as a key pillar in countering extremism as well as communicating effectively. Findings from research enable the government to pre-empt crises by recognising the real push and pull factors, thus making it possible to create swift solutions to specific problems or tensions. This inevitably informs strategic communication.
- Recognising the importance of influencers and engaging clerics, traditional leaders etc who can steer the perception of vulnerable people away from extremist ideologies.
- Conducting intensive communication campaigns that counter extremist narratives and build confidence in the state.
- Disengaging combatants considered low risk and reintegrated them into the community and protecting their rights. The process is handled within a human right's compliant context Denying disengaged combatants their fundamental human rights could enable wider sympathy and support for violent extremism and disincentivizes combatants from moving away from violence.



THE CASE OF SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN: Addressing Separatism and Secessionist Movements with Legislative Action and International Support.

The people of Southern Sudan strivings for their right to self-determination led to the enactment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Act (SSRA or 'the Referendum Act' or 'the Act'). The referendum was carried out by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC). It owed its success to the strong technical, operational, and logistical support provided by the international community, including the United Nations (UN), the International Federation of Electoral Systems (IFES), the European Union, coordinated by the United Nations Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED). The support of this community did not undermine the SSRC's ownership of the process or the commission's independence. The referendum clarified the terms on which a person was eligible to vote. Being that a person permanently residing without interruption, or whose parents or grandparents are residing permanently, without interruption in Southern Sudan since the 1st of January 1956; a person who had reached 18 years of age; and someone who was of sound mind. Importantly, The Referendum Act allowed Southern Sudanese who met the eligibility criteria to register and vote not only in Southern Sudan but also in Northern Sudan and in eight out-of-country voting locations, being Australia, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, UK, and USA. This facilitated broad participation and ensured that people had confidence in the system.

THE KENYAN CASE: Recognizing that radicalization and recruitment, key proponents to propagating extremism could not be tackled by the army, the Kenyan government enacted a National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE). This is the national document that guides different stakeholders on how to counter violent extremism in Kenya. Prior to September 2016, Kenya was guided by its Constitution and other security related laws as the guiding principles for combating violent extremism and terrorism. For instance, the Kenyan army was stationed in Somalia fighting radical groups. The persistence of radical Islamism and extremism therefore necessitated the enactment of a multidimensional approach to effectively fight radical groups. The NSCVE is designed to achieve the following objectives:

- Countering extremist propaganda and ideology.
- Reducing support and recruitment into terrorist organisations.

- Enhance engagement and support to local communities that are targeted by violent extremists.
- Develop and deploy expertise in non-coercive approaches to CT in the military and law enforcement services.
- Assisting individuals to disengage from violent extremist and terrorist groups.
- Rehabilitating violent extremist who have disowned extremism and are not a part of ongoing plots against the people and government of Kenya.
- Counter radicalisation efforts: which are approaches efforts to delegitimize violent extremist ideologies to deter recruitment into specific terrorist groups or campaigns.
- Rehabilitation and reintegration of disengaged violent extremists.
- Multi-agency coordination and engagement of communities in reintegration.

V. Crosscutting Solutions: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Nigeria has engaged in several DDR programs without a formal DDR Policy. The Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP) currently in its 11th year has led to the reduction of militancy in the Niger Delta, but a design flaw means that it cannot be terminated without the risk of militancy reemerging in the region. The country's consistent use of blanket amnesty has culminated in an interim solution that can relapse into violence in greater proportion. In contextualizing the Niger Delta amnesty programme, ex-combatants received money and job training as incentives to disarm whereas victims typically received no assistance in rebuilding their lives. Such imbalances are ill-advised and may foster resentment, making receiving communities reluctant to reintegrate ex-combatants, threatening post conflict stability.

The OSC is another example of the DDR program the country is running. It is a custodian DDR with the aim of reducing the rank and file of Boko Haram insurgents. The lack of judicial and non-judicial accountability for intake of the programs has been strongly criticised as promoting impunity. Citizens can neither fathom why Niger Delta militants or Boko Haram members who have killed and destroyed public infrastructure can be reintegrated into society without penalty.

The two DDR processes highlighted above do not follow the normal DDR framework and has not been effective in reducing violence. Currently with the proliferation of conflicts there is an urgent need for a formal DDR process. For instance, the ongoing peace agreements and negotiations between the bandits and the Northwest governors lack a legal framework that ensures successful outcomes.

Civil Military Relations

The long deployment of the military in several internal security operations has



become very problematic and counterproductive. Deploying the military to maintain internal security highlights the inadequacies of existing security agencies whose primary responsibility is to maintain law and order as well as internal security. There is a notable failure to call for decisive action to thoroughly review institutional culture, training, doctrines, and modes of operation of security agencies. These agencies must be reoriented to effectively reduce the added burden on the military to maintain law and order and oversee internal security operations. One major policy option to consider is the creation of state security agencies to complement the federal agencies. It is imperative that the reform and reorientation of the non-military security agencies involve trainings on how to respect human rights of citizens while effectively responding to security threats.

Arms Proliferation


Nigeria must take major steps to control the flow of illegal arms into the country. The first step should be to strengthen the control of our borders, to detect and seize any illegal shipment of arms into the country, and arrest and prosecute any person enabling the illegal flow of arms into the country. Nigeria should reach out to overseas arms dealers with a view to enlist their cooperation against sales of arms to non-state actors. A third step should be a major diplomatic initiative with the governments of countries known to have companies engaged in selling arms to non-state actors. The relevant authority should work closely with the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW) domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser.

Transitional Justice

The absence of a transitional justice framework remains a challenge in addressing intractable conflicts in Nigeria. Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD) has already developed a document on Transitional Justice, which was designed with Boko Haram in mind. The transitional justice process in Nigeria has focused on setting up development commission such as the Northeast Development Commission (NEDC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The problem with these frameworks is that they are not comprehensive and lack the full range of processes and mechanisms to serve justice and reconciliation in addition to the promotion of the rule of law.

Countering Disinformation

Algorithms, prone to automated manipulation, control the information we receive and has made that it is ever more difficult to navigate online spaces. Social media analysis has revealed that the Nigerian online space show evidence of up to 19.5% bot usage . These are programs or scripts written to artificially increase visibility of specified content. In recognition of this, social media companies themselves have a critical role to play in moderating content on their platforms. It is therefore imperative that the development of such a regulatory framework must be done in conjunction with the Nigerian government and social media companies.



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RECOMMENDATIONS

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THEME 1: LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
1.	Vigilante Groups have played a formidable role in addressing the gaps left open by the absence or inadequate presence of security operatives. This is especially so because they know the terrain of the bushes and forests, and sometimes have had relationships in the past with criminal persons of interest. Given this gap, it is imperative to include vigilante groups in the security infrastructure, and seek ways to institutionalize them within the local security estate.	✓		12 Months
2.	Establish Local Security Committees (LSC) in every local government area nationwide. The LSC should include representatives of all security agencies, relevant MDAs, Traditional Rulers, PCRC, and Religious Groups to ensure transparency, accountability easier access and sufficient security funding outside the ministerial bureaucracy.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
3.	Enact new legislation and protocol to make it easier to hold security agencies and personnel's accountable for any security abuses in their areas of jurisdictions and command. This will involve amendment to the Sherriff Act for instance.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
4.	Create a new team under the NPF to train and work with the guards of Nigeria's forest. This unit will collaborate with the current Forest Guards who will remain under the control of States.	✓		12-20 Months
5.	Breaking of Nigeria's Communities into clusters with security codes given to each cluster and local informants recruited by the Police.	✓		12-20 Months

LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
6.	Embark on an effective disarmament process to recover all illegal arms and ammunition in circulation in local communities. A multiplicity of strategies including incentives should be employed to ensure success.	✓		12-20 Months
7.	Create new structure to make security personnel accountable to both the state and communities in which they operate even if indirectly. Police Area Commanders should be made to produce a report of their stewardship every three months. This report should be shared with the Local Security Committees nationwide.	✓		12-20 Months
8	Set up structures for observing and reporting the behaviour of security/military personnel from community to national levels in a way that promotes public confidence and accountability. This may require a new National helpline being created that will take calls from citizens nationwide.	✓		12-20 Months
9.	Create a national legal framework that will provide full anonymity and protection of informers and under-cover agents in security matters.		✓	12-20 Months
10	More Police and Security/Military personnel should be released for front line duties by an Executive Order from the President requiring Civilians to be employed for back-office and domestic duties currently carried out by trained Police and Military officers.	✓		12-20 Months
11	Widespread deployment and utilization of modern surveillance equipment such as drones, CCTVs, aircrafts, telegraphic and electronic monitors to the localities and communities.	✓		12-20 Months
12	Initiate an URGENT POLICE REFORM Program to be led by the Presidency and supported by the NASS as needed. An Executive-Legislative Panel should be established to steer the reform at the highest level.	✓	✓	12-20 Months

LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
13	Geofencing farmlands and other critical infrastructure. A geofence is a virtual boundary that can be created, viewed and edited visually on an interactive map in order to monitor a specific location and the movement of any target relative to this location.	✓		12-20 Months
14	A distinct Salary Scale for the police outside of the unified public service pay scales should be created to reflect the full scale of the work being done by the police in Nigeria.	✓	✓	
15	It is recommended that the police authorities should produce as a minimum, a five-year strategic plan, that will itemise its funding requirements and operational strategy over that period. The budgets allocated will therefore track this plan and allow for multi-year settlement to be possible. The era of reactive annual firefighting must come to an end	✓		12-20 Months
16	A System of terror alert levels should be introduced. Increasing public vigilance and resilience: Providing an accurate and balanced assessment of a terrorist threat is critical to the successful mobilization of public support and the encouragement of public vigilance.	✓		12-20 Months
17	Change to Police posting regime. Police leaders should ensure that police officers working with communities are assigned for a long-enough period to allow them to develop a sophisticated understanding of those communities and to build trusting relationships with members that, in turn, can facilitate effective engagement and co-operation with the public.	✓		12-20 Months

LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
18	The Almajiri system should be reformed in order to make the children in the system useful to themselves and the society. To this end, education must be aggressively pursued and made compulsory for all the children.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
19	Establish Early Warning Mechanisms (both human and electronic) at the community level, and this should be connected to effective response systems.	✓		6-12 Months
20	As a matter of public policy, a law should be enacted giving all serving police officers free travel privileges on all government (local, state and federal) owned transportation systems (with the exception of air travel). This will ease the operational movement of the police in emergencies, but also reduce the transportation budget of the police or at least make the funds available go further.	✓	✓	

THEME 2: STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
1.	It is recommended that a statutory requirement of a minimum of one working patrol vehicle per police station should be enacted. If the number of police station need to be reduced to make this happen, that will be acceptable, especially in urban areas when many stations are not far from each other.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
2.	Inter-Agency cooperation should be mandated. A joint intelligence platform or system should be created with other law enforcement agencies to enable a unified assessment of threats and risks to national security.	✓		12-20 Months
3.	Make monthly security briefing to a combined NASS Committee by heads of security institutions compulsory by law.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
4.	Amend the law to ensure that the security votes for the President and Governors are verifiably invested in security infrastructure.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
5.	There should be urgent amendment of Sections 215 and 216 of the Constitution. This should address one main areas of concern: ► The IGP should be provided with a constitutional pathway to challenge any unlawful direction from the president.	✓	✓	12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
6.	<p>The authorities should establish the use of online reporting platform for crime reporting. All police officers should be trained in the use of modern technology as part of a new way of working.</p> <p>There are lots of non-urgent and non-life-threatening crimes that can be reported online for police reference generation and subsequent action if needed. In Nigeria currently, if you lose your credit card and simply want to report it for insurance purpose, you have to physically visit a police station.</p>	✓		12-20 Months
7.	<p>The NPF should strengthen and widen the operations of its Border Force Unit. They should be better equipped and trained to secure our national borders.</p>	✓		12-20 Months
8	<p>Any police officers involved in shooting of a member of the public should be immediately put on desk duty until a determination of whether the shooting is a “Good” or “Bad” shooting.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Good shooting should require legitimate self-defence or protection of another to be present. ▶ Bad shooting will be careless, negligent or misconduct shooting. ▶ A statutory determination of the classification of the shooting must be made within 7days (as an example). ▶ Bad shootings can then be investigated more thoroughly after this initial determination. This investigation can be done internally by the police, but the proposed Inspectorate will have full access to examine these and report on them. 	✓		12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
9.	The security function of the NSCDC should be defined to focus on community level policing and intelligence gathering operations. And states that have commissioned regional/state level security outfits (Amotekun, Hisbah, Ebube Agu, etc.) should be required to merge these structures within the new NSCDC organisation that would be within the control of the State Government.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
10	To improve public confidence in the police, all police spokespersons must be put under a new statutory/legal duty not to mislead the public. Misleading the people or the media should become gross misconduct and sacking offence. People must be able to trust statements made by the police. This will help increase confidence in the police and earn them much needed public goodwill and support.	✓		12-20 Months
11	A “ <i>Federal Police, Local Policy</i> ” system should be developed. The priorities of the police in each state and divisions should reflect local needs and preference rather than a nationally imposed operational priority. This will mean Nigeria will continue to operate national police but with locally decided priorities. This will create more local accountability for the police, thus improving links with the communities. This will also begin to sow the seed of policing by consent in the minds of serving officers.	✓		12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
12	The relevant House of Representatives committee responsible for oversight functions in agencies like NDLEA, NIS and NOA should develop scorecards for measuring their effectiveness and work with open data providers like the NBS to ensure these metrics are continuously collated and analysed for public consumption – to build a performance culture in the agencies on the one hand and also to gain public confidence in the agencies.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
13	Promote the establishment of domestic military-industrial complexes led by the private sector for the production of essential materials for the military and security forces especially those basic and most essential items.	✓		18-20 Months
14	Deliver on the basic concept of developing land, air and sea based electronic surveillance, interception and suppression systems that would meet the requirements of both offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities for the country. A Territorial Defence System (TDS) apportioned appropriately to the Police, Army, Navy and Air Force respectively, and also encompassing other sectors in the intelligence gathering and analysis architecture, should serve as the platform to enable each arm to operate either singly or in tandem in a cascading or overlapping manner.	✓		12-20 Months
15	Police should be brought under more local democratic accountability, even with a federal police command structure. A new State Advisory Boards (SABs) should be established by statute for each state command of the police. The SAB should include all key stakeholders in the state. This is not a security panel meeting the state Governors have with security chiefs in the state. The SAB will enable each local areas bring to the table their top local challenges for the State Police Commissioner to review, respond and action.	✓	✓	12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
16	<p>It is recommended that name of the police be change from the Nigeria Police Force to The Nigerian Police Service.</p> <p>This word 'Force' reinforces the militarised thrust and disposition of the police and make it look like an arm of the Military rather than a service to the community. This change will also have a psychological impact on serving officers that they are not a force unit but service providers to the public.</p>	✓	✓	20-24 Months
17	<p>Section 215(5) of the constitution will require amendments to give effect section 46 of the same constitution that confers special jurisdiction to state high courts to entertain cases of violation of fundamental human rights by the Nigeria Police force in exercise of its powers under the constitution or any statutory law.</p>	✓	✓	12-20 Months
18	<p>National Assembly should exercise its powers under section 217(2)(c) to make laws to regulate circumstances under which the president may empower the Armed forces to suppress insurrections and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order.</p>		✓	12-20 Months
19	<p>Section 4(d) of the police act, 2020 should be amended to regulate powers of the police. Specific provisions on the nature of collaboration between police and other security agencies should be clearly defined to indicate which agency plays 'lead' or 'supporting' role especially in joint operations.</p>	✓	✓	12-20 Months
20	<p>There is also the need for objective criteria and mechanism for determining when and how the Armed forces can act in aid of civil authorities. A proper PROTOCOL should be put in place for this.</p>		✓	12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
21	Section 2 of the NSA Act should be amended to enhance the visibility of defence intelligence agency under subsection (1) of that section and insert specific provisions that will facilitate inter-agency synergy among the agencies under the office of the National Security Adviser.		✓	12-20 Months
22	Section 1a (3) of the Terrorism Act should be further amended to make adequate provisions for collaboration in intelligence gathering and sharing with penalties for default.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
23	Section 27(1)(a) of the NSCDC act should be amended to make ministerial directives specific to avoid conflict with presidential directives to the police or armed forces under the constitution or any relevant law.		✓	12-20 Months
24	Section 1(4)(a), armed forces act should be amended to whether the scope of power of enforcing and assisting to enforce immigration laws by the navy is subject to control of the immigration service or otherwise.	✓	✓	12-20 Months
25	Procurement and deployment of technology-based border management equipment and devices; with distanced, efficient and effective controls rooms	✓		12-20 Months
26	Introduce tri-service command system. Amplifying the role of the sector commanders to be in charge of all AFN Soldiers under them regardless of which service they come from. The Sector commander should also be able deploy assets and resources needed regardless of the military service involved and without a need to secure permission for the service chiefs.	✓		12-20 Months

STRATEGIC KINETIC NATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
27	Instruct the Immediate enhanced training for the Police Mobile Unit to improve their capacity to deal with insecurity. A special team of 40,000 Police Mobile Unite officers should undergo this special training. 10,000 should then be deployed to every state for immediately operations. North East, South West, South East can receive the officers remaining out of the 40k.	✓		12-20 Months

THEME 3: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
1.	To address the global perspectives, Nigeria should establish Bilateral commission with all the neighbouring countries to intensify diplomacy.	✓		12 Months
2.	Deliberate effort should be made by the Nigerian security sector as a whole to promote the learning of French language. All our neighbouring countries are French speaking.	✓		12-24 Months
3.	Sourcing for security intelligence and security surveillance, both within and outside the country must be intensified by the SSS and NIA.	✓		12-24 Months
4.	Rededicating Nigeria's resolve to the pursuit of African regional integration with ECOWAS as one of the building blocks. Enhanced interaction with other regional actors would be necessary in this regard especially with the neighbouring States namely Niger and Benin Republic that are members of ECOWAS.	✓		12-24 Months
5.	Ensure a more proactive protection of Nigerian cyberspace and electronic infrastructure from hacking and criminal interference.	✓		12-24 Months
6.	Carry out all functions of entities under commission, including acting as focal point regarding all security threats.	✓		12-24 Months
7.	Financial Sanctions and Travel Restrictions: Establish Programs to prevent terrorists from financing their operations, including technical assistance to build the capacity of allies.	✓		12-24 Months

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS				
S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
8.	Assistance to Counter Terrorist Financing: The Central bank of Nigeria should consider efforts to develop financial sector oversight capabilities within African states necessary for preventing the transnational financing of terrorism. Many African banking systems remain vulnerable to terrorists and other criminals, and we need to track the flow of funds, conduct oversight of remittance systems, or freeze and confiscate terrorist-related assets.	✓		12-24 Months
9.	Government should ensure that the law on terrorism is enforced to the letter without show of sentiment.	✓		12-24 Months
10.	The security of our country's borders should be reviewed to ensure that all the nooks and crannies of the country's land borders through which aliens can enter the country are properly policed with structures and equipment emplaced with the immigration and customs and other security officials stationed there, to screen immigrants and emigrants accordingly.	✓		12-24 Months
11.	Tighten arms control measures and sign-up cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries to enforce similar measures.	✓		12-24 Months
12.	Strengthen the intelligence unit within the Nigerian immigration service to generate useful analytics from immigration data (cross-border movements & correlations) and feed into the central intelligence pool by the DSS/SSS and NIA.	✓		12-24 Months
13.	Re-energizing the war against Boko Haram in consultation and collaboration with neighbouring countries within the existing framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). In this endeavour also, the entire might and resources of the country should be mobilized to deal with this lingering threat once for all	✓		12-24 Months

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
14	Convening of a summit meeting of ECOWAS leaders in Abuja under Mr. President's auspices, to discuss peace and security matters in the region, as well as make preparations for all important Continental and international high-level meetings with other ECOWAS Member-States to establish common positions and perspectives as much as practicable.	✓		12-24 Months
15	Convening of summit level meeting of the LCBC Member-States to address threats to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin, as well as discuss issues pertaining to resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons across the four countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.	✓		12-24 Months
16	Convening of a summit level meeting of the Greater Sahel Region to define threats and challenges of variegated nature that face the entire region such as those emanating from Libya, Mali, The Sudan etc., and propose measures towards their amelioration.	✓		12-24 Months
17	To revitalize the Gulf of Guinea Commission and spearhead initiatives in concert with other Member States towards tackling all security threats emanating from the Atlantic zone of the country.	✓		12-24 Months
18.	Enhanced cooperation with the African Union Commission (AUC) and other continental structures such as NEPAD and APRM should lead towards Nigeria's active engagement with the rest of the Continent, and adoption of a leadership posture in Africa.	✓		12-24 Months
19.	Nigeria should provide a leadership role and set the pace in harmonising the different security and economic organs that have sprung up within the Gulf of Guinea Commission Member-States for better securing of her southern approaches.	✓		12-24 Months

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SOLUTIONS



S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
20.	Prioritising relations with the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Nigeria would need to redress her posture towards the Middle East particularly in relation to conflicts and mediation, containment of radical tendencies and extremism which have since become existential issues to many countries and governments both in the Middle East and Africa.	✓		12-24 Months
21.	Seize every opportunity to press Nigeria to fulfil its obligations under international law regarding torture, treatment of detainees and due process guarantees. Press about report of excessive use of force and extra-legal activity among Nigerian security forces and the importance of protecting human rights.	✓		12-24 Months
22.	Establishment by government of a witness protection program and proper training of security and justice personnel to ensure compliance with international due process standards.	✓	✓	12-24 Months
23.	Continue to press Nigeria, consistent with its obligations under the Rome Statute and the Principle of complementarity, to ensure that individuals implicated in serious crimes committed in violation of international law, including crimes against humanity, are investigated and prosecuted according to international fair trial standards.	✓		12-24 Months
24.	Require by law that external bodies responsible for scrutinizing security services make publicly available versions of their periodic investigation reports.	✓		12-24 Months

THEME 4: NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
1	It is recommended that government should invest in research and development of non-lethal systems through innovation and development of technologies with appropriate level of funding.	✓		12-24 Months
2	Psychological operations aimed at undermining the enemy's confidence, moral and decision-making capabilities such as propaganda should be launched and intensified	✓		12-24 Months
3	Economic warfare aimed at degrading enemy productivity through freezing of suspects bank accounts and obstruction of their supply routes.	✓		12-24 Months
4	Cyber warfare aimed at penetrating, damaging or subverting enemy IT systems.	✓		12-24 Months
5	Cryptographic warfare, including cryptanalysis aimed at intercepting enemy communications while defeating any attempts to intercept your own.	✓		12-24 Months
6	Create a 3-4 digit, easy-to-memorize national emergency number and publish same for citizen awareness. This should replace the different numbers some states have created.	✓		12 Months
7	Make twice yearly State of the Nation Presidential briefing on national security on national TV/Radio a mandatory constitutional requirement.	✓	✓	12-24 Months
8	Initiate and sustain Intelligence operation, principally signals intelligence (sight) and human intelligence aimed at uncovering secret enemy capabilities or operations.	✓		12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
9	Establish a resident database in each state to document all residents. This should also include mandatory registration of tenants (know your tenant) by landlords and mandatory registration of domestic employees (know your employee) on the resident database. All operators of commercial transportation services and members of transport unions should also be mandatorily registered on the database. This database should be linked to existing identification platforms like NIN, Drivers' license, National Passport and BVN.			12-24 Months
10	Create a limited window (3 months maximum) for any combatant on the side of the insurgents to surrender and be protected under a conditional amnesty programme which will protect them against prosecution, provide assistance (training and financial value equivalent to recovered weapons) to reintegrate them to normal society and protect them against reprisal attack by the insurgent groups in exchange for them giving useful intelligence to Government security forces.			12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
11	<p>Restructure the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and resource the agency with competent and capable individuals that would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Generate engaging audio-visual contents to stimulate national consciousness and patriotism. b) Distribute the contents across multiple media channels (Radio, TV, social media, Newsprint) on a consistent and continuous basis. c) Engage community organisations and religious institutions across the country as partners in the national orientation campaign. d) Institute a reward and recognition program that identifies, rewards and showcases exemplary/sacrificial conducts by Nigerians that aligns with the ideals of patriotic citizenship. e) The NOA should also partner existing private NGOs focused on fact-checking fake news to empower such NGOs with information that would enable them quickly to respond to fake news and reduce their damaging impact on public perception and psyche. 	✓		12-24 Months
12	Setting a declassification period and process (backed by law) for security vote: Security votes at all levels should be declassified at end of four years for legislative review and four years thereafter for public access, towards improving the utilization of the votes for Enhancing security.	✓	✓	12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
13	<p>Promote actively Intelligence and information gathering: these can be acquired the following methods;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interception of telecommunications • Intelligence gathering in lieu of interception of telecommunications • Telecommunications surveillance • Procurement of base station data • Technical hardware monitoring • Transmission reproduction • Network traffic intelligence • Systematic monitoring • Covert intelligence gathering • Acquiring intelligence that identifies a telecommunications address or terminal hardware • Undercover operations • Undercover purchasing • Guided human intelligence operations • Duplication • Intercepting a dispatch for the purpose of duplication • On-site audio monitoring • On-site visual monitoring • Technical surveillance • Intelligence gathering on specific locations 	✓		12-24 Months
14	<p>Every Nigerian deserves to be treated with dignity and rights; Hence all regions in the country should own a development commission, e.g Niger Delta Development Commission, South-west Development Commission, North East Development Commission, South east Development commission, etc. This will need to be backed with Legislation.</p>	✓	✓	12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
15	Strengthen the Federal Character law, to ensure better and more vigorous enforcement and implementation.	✓	✓	12-24 Months
16.	Comprehensive Survey of National Infrastructure Facilities (CSNIF) to ascertain the security of key national infrastructure facilities and their economic viability over a determined period of time.	✓		12-24 Months
17	Alignment of all National Economic Policies and Programmes Under a Comprehensive National Economic Development Strategy (CNEDS) that establishes a ten-year baseline for monitoring and assessment of all economic policies and programmes towards ensuring compliance with national economic development directives and prevention of deviations from laid down outlines and frameworks.	✓		12-24 Months
18	Need to conduct a National Security Threat Assessment Studies (NSTAS) to determine the immediate, medium and long-term security threats to Nigeria both from internal and external sources, and provide contingency plans for mitigation, amelioration and neutralization of these threats. The study should focus on Air, Land and Maritime threats to Nigeria.	✓		12-24 Months
19	Need to conduct a Spatial Assessment of Threats to National Security (SATNS) such as those posed by the phenomenon of “ungoverned or ungovernable spaces” in Nigeria, to eliminate danger zones and hot spots of criminality and banditry across Nigeria.	✓		12-24 Months
20.	Threat of Mass / Popular Uprising and National Security (M/PUNS) should focus on the various dimensions of mass or popular uprisings to determine their causes, and decide on strategies and tactics for responding to them such as evidenced by the #EndSARS protests and ensuing riots across several States of Nigeria.	✓		12-24 Months
21	Reduce proliferation of hard drugs, as there is a direct link between hard drug use and the level of violence in a community. This will require special funding being made available to the NDLEA.	✓		12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
22	Ensure that security services and their oversight bodies are not exempt from ambit of freedom of information legislation and instead require that decisions not to provide information are taken on a case-by-case basis, properly justified and subject to the supervision of an independent information/data commissioner.	✓		12-24 Months
23	Ensure better representation of women in security agencies at all levels.	✓		12-24 Months
24	Use of Dialogue: The basic approach of talking and listening by aggrieved parties, with a third-party mediating, not only calms nerves but has with empirical evidence proved to be best option of ensuring peace and security. The dialogues include inter-ethnic, inter-religious, inter-community, inter-personal, inter-ideological, state and non-state actors dialogue, inter-demographic among others.	✓		12-24 Months
25	Establishment of interventionist agencies to identify and provide little investment and sustenance opportunities to ex-convicts, jobless youths, discharged but indigents military and paramilitary personnel, among others; it is being alleged that most of the violent crimes are committed by these classes of the citizens.		✓	12-24 Months
26	Strategic training and re-training of the community leaders who often act as change agents and role models in the communities/ societies.	✓		12-24 Months

NON-LETHAL AND NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS

S/N	Recommendation	Executive Action	Legislative Action	Indicative Timeline
27	When communities of people or societies feel excluded from access to power, opportunity, services, and security, it creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or in the context of human rights abuses. In order to ensure that such grievances do not devolve into violence, government must proactively and directly target patterns of local and institutional exclusion . To contain crisis means that government must proactively create economic opportunities for people. This is because conflicts arise when groups contest access to power, resources, services, and security.	✓		12-24 Months
28	Encourage the Intelligence agencies (working with the Chief of Defence Staff) to initiate a screening & vetting programme of all frontline officers of the Nigerian military to fish out moles and double-agents who have so far compromised most efforts at combating insecurity and win the war against insurgents and terrorists.	✓		



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Promote actively Intelligence and information gathering...

EFFECTS ON NIGERIA
OF DEVELOPING AND
EMERGING GLOBAL
SECURITY THREATS

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SECURITY THREATS

CONCLUSION



As reflected in this report; there are many security concerns and feeders of insecurity that are international in nature. While some of the common global security challenges facing Western countries are yet to fully manifest in Nigeria; the nation must be prepared and be aware of these looming security concerns. The main future insecurity trend Nigeria needs to watch out for are:

INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

As Nigeria grow in its research and development capabilities; the nation will become a target of industrial espionage. Other nations seeking to steal intellectual property and trade secrets of other nations is not new. But as a nation develops in its technological industrial capability, it will become an increasing target for industrial espionage. Nigerian government need to be proactive in designing policies and procedures to deal with this possibility.



CYBER HACKING AND ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE

With the inevitable global movement towards Internet of Things; where most appliances and equipment will be joined up with easy interoperability; hacking and electronic interference will become an increasing source of insecurity and security breaches. From cars, to all household appliances to industrial equipment, all will be links to the internet for ease of remote control and better user experience. Together with increasing use of Artificial Intelligence; cyber and electronic activism and terrorism will inevitably become a global concern than it is at the moment. A nation like Nigeria; need to prepare for these inevitable consequences of technological growth.



CHEMICAL WARFARE AND USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The Internet is full of all manner of instructions and manuals that terrorists can use to make crude chemical weapons that can kill many and spread fear amongst the residents of any country. Nigeria is not exempt from this concern. Alongside the availability of small nuclear devices obtained from unscrupulous state actors in some countries; the possibility of mass murders and insecurity caused by weapons of mass destruction is real and should be prepared for by the Nigerian government. Proactive steps and plans must be designed to counter any attempt by terrorist to use a weapon of mass destruction within the Nigerian territory. This will include a better and more coordinated intelligence landscape in Nigeria. A fragmented intelligence operations promotes insecurity by itself.

DELIBERATE SABOTAGE BY DISGRUNTLED OFFICIALS

Those with access and inside knowledge of how the government work have the capacity to create mass insecurity by deliberate sabotage of infrastructures and state facilities. The disgruntlement can be as a result of perceived bad treatment by governments or be induced through pecuniary gains. A sophisticated and coordinated intelligence landscape will be needed to identify patterns and join the dots that will lead to proactive prevention of these possibilities.

SPYING AND DOUBLE AGENTS WITHIN SECURITY AGENCIES AND KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

Nations have always inserted spies in the systems of other nations as a source of intelligence and creating national advantage. Evidence was presented by contributors to the Security Summit of the presence of spies and double agents with the Nigerian security and governmental operations. From those sabotaging the nation's attempts at industrial development because the third-party nations from whom we import want to keep our business at all cost; some others want Nigeria to remain dependent on them for many things; double agents and spies exists across the nation's security and key industrial estate based on the reports. This is also present in the military where sympathisers of various terror groups tip them off and compromise military strategies and operations. Nigeria needs to be more proactive in combating this danger to national security.



LONE AND UNCOORDINATED TERRORIST ATTACKS.

Since the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; their sympathisers have spread all over the world with instructions to act unilaterally using crude and difficult to detect means to carry out terror attacks. That is why in many Western countries, we have seen many cases on lone terrorists using vehicles, knives and other commonly available tools to attack and kill innocent people. Based on some reports submitted to the Security Summit; this threat is looming in Nigeria as radicalisation of terrorist sympathisers is reaching an unhealthy peak. Lone attack is a major source of problem for even the most advanced countries. With little or no planning required; intelligence is difficult to gather before such attacks. Nigeria must devise an engagement strategy that will include effective and consistent deradicalizing programmes across the country.

FINALLY

Some of the recommendations in this report have been informed and shaped by the need to address and combat these emerging causes of insecurity. Top of these recommendations are those that deals with Intelligence Reform in Nigeria and eradicating the crisis of overlapping mandates among our many security agencies.



CONCLUSION
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Conclusion





There is no denying the insecurity challenge in Nigeria has become formidable for the Nigerian government and peoples. Government and the polity have become aware of the growing dissatisfaction, discomfort and distress within the larger society coupled with the unabating official corruption, high unemployment rate, economic crisis, decaying infrastructure and a futile national integration project that has heated up the socio-political environment. Consequently, armed conflicts, terrorism, ethno- religious holocausts, kidnapping, political assassination and other violent crimes have become the norm of the Nigerian society.

There is an acknowledgement that government has made efforts to contain the burning platform of insecurity ravaging several locations across, however there is also the acceptance that more needs to be done in other to hold the country together and bring it back from the edge of the crevice it is currently on. There needs to be an altogether mind set change and rebuilding the moral foundation upon which the country currently lies on.

The National Security summit reviewed the security challenges and requested submissions from a wide range of stakeholders, contributors and consultants. The recommendations herein are just a beginning of the arduous task facing the government and the people, paying lip-service to the matters of insecurity in Nigeria by government and its representatives is no longer acceptable, the people are demanding more accountability and with the advent of technology and social media, the society is sitting on a time-bomb that may soon explode. Sustaining personal or regime security will not secure government or its representatives if this challenge is not nipped in the bud. The governance process must be erected on the pillars of moral values and virtues and the Nigerian people must be led by a moral leadership that will strive to secure the commitment and support of all citizens to truly make Nigeria reach it's true potential.

Not only must leadership look at the various recommendations and move swiftly to tackle the issue but leadership must look to reviving and reinforcing the moral values and virtue ethics in the country and start to build through rejuvenation of the educational system a country that starts to codify these values/principles so that Nigerians, small and old, can begin to imbibe these virtues to guide their conduct, behaviour and social relations with others. The Nigerian government carries a moral burden to lead by example and deliver moral leadership that eschews corruption, inequity & injustice to build a country based on good democratic governance that will begin to deliver the needed economic and social infrastructure that will impact positively on the standard of living of Nigerians and deliver the citizenry from poverty, anarchy and unemployment that many of the citizens have been subjected to for years.

IMMEDIATE SUGGESTED
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR LEGISLATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION

**IMMEDIATE SUGGESTED
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR LEGISLATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION**

IMMEDIATE SUGGESTED
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR LEGISLATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION



- 1.** Set a declassification period and process (backed by law) for security votes: Security votes at all levels should be declassified at the end of four years for legislative review and four years thereafter for public access, towards improving the utilization of the votes for Enhancing security.
- 2.** Establish development commissions across all six (6) of Nigeria's geopolitical zones: e.g Niger Delta Development Commission, South West Development Commission, North East Development Commission, South East Development commission, etc. This will need to be backed with Legislation.
- 3.** Strengthen the Federal Character law, to ensure better and more vigorous enforcement and implementation. Every Nigerian deserves to be treated with dignity and rights irrespective of where they may physically be located in the country;
- 4.** Establish interventionist agency (or add to the role of an existing Agency) to identify and provide little investment and sustenance opportunities to ex-convicts, jobless youths, discharged but indigents military and paramilitary personnel, among others; it is being alleged that most of the violent crimes are committed by these classes of citizens. Maintain a central database of convicted persons, persons who have served out their terms, and persons in prisons and awaiting trial.
- 5.** Establish a national transitional justice framework. The absence of a unifying Transitional justice framework remains a challenge in addressing Nigeria's intractable conflicts. Existing Transitional Justice frameworks e.g., designed to address the Niger-Delta or the Boko Haram insurgency, will require review, towards applying them to the many victims of the other security challenges.
- 6.** Invite representatives from Google, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Twitter to a special dialogue to discuss a voluntary Platform Regulations framework that centres the need for platforms to have content regulation policies themselves that are well designed and consistently enforced in Nigeria. Increasingly complex phenomena such as the use of automation to manipulate algorithms that control the digital information, we see mean that it is ever more difficult to navigate online spaces. Social media analysis has revealed that the Nigerian online space shows evidence of up to 19.5% bot usage; that is to say, programs or scripts were written to artificially increase the visibility of certain kinds of content. In recognition of this, social media companies themselves have an ever more important role to play in moderating content on their platforms.
- 7.** Resolve legislatively, the crisis of overlapping mandates amongst the various security related agencies.

IMMEDIATE SUGGESTED
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EXECUTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION

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IMMEDIATE SUGGESTED
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EXECUTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION



- 1.** Instruct the immediate enhanced training for the Police Mobile Unit to improve their capacity to deal with insecurity. A special team of 40,000 Police Mobile Unit officers should undergo this special training. 1,000 should then be deployed to every state for immediate operations.
- 2.** Create a new team under the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) to train and work with the guards of Nigeria's forest. This unit will collaborate with the current Forest Guards who will remain under the control of States.
- 3.** Encourage the Intelligence Agencies (working with the National Security Adviser and the Chief of Defence Staff) to initiate a screening & vetting program of all frontline officers of the Nigerian military to fish out moles and double-agents who have so far compromised most efforts at combating insecurity and win the war against insurgents and terrorists;
- 4.** Strategically, the Executive should initiate a Presidential Police Reform initiative that will be resident in one central place within the Presidency. Also, an operational specialised unit should be established within the NPF to champion and drive all the change initiatives (based on a Presidential Policing Reform Roadmap) from within the institution;
- 5.** Direct the use of the Nigerian Police Trust Fund to procure some of the immediate equipment need of the rank-and-file police officers in Nigeria. This intervention will include the procurement of modern critical equipment for the Nigeria Police Force as specified by the leadership of the NPF.
- 6.** Give immediate consideration to the use of Private Defence Contractors for targeted security operations to combat insurgency and terrorism especially.
- 7.** Urge the Executive to use all means at its disposal (while Legislation is pending), to require the creation of a protocol that will compel intelligence (as a matter of necessity) sharing amongst all security agencies.
- 8.** Deploy Early Warning Systems nationwide including installation of CCTV cameras and other surveillance, satellite and electronic equipment along major highways, public places, and major cities and our borders;
- 9.** Establish and strengthen a National Crisis Centre (NCC) within the Nigerian Police. The NCC will be the national coordinating centre for all civil security response actions and monitoring of resolutions of such with monthly reporting on all incidents. It will also be the central place for any Nigerian to report major security incidents.
- 10.** Through an Executive Order, initiate a Civilianisation program in all our security agencies. This should compel the agencies to use civilian staff to perform most Backoffice and non-tactical duties. This initiative will free up thousands of security personnel for frontline duties immediately.
- 11.** Mandate and resource the National Orientation Agency and the Federal Ministry of Information to begin a structured strategic communication and orientation campaign using all available media channels and platforms to

promote peaceful coexistence and national unity.

- 12.** Support to the creation of Local Security Committees in all 774 Local Government Areas. This panel should include Traditional Rulers, Religious institutions, and local opinion leaders. This should be managed by the NPF.
- 13.** The use and development of grazing reserves and ranching should be pursued in lower population areas. Pilot schemes should commence immediately in all states that are positively disposed to it.
- 14.** Strengthening the judicial and law enforcement administration through a Digitisation initiative for the judiciary. This will speed up the administration of Justice and reduce corruption. Swift administration of justice will help reduce causes of disaffection which feeds into insecurity.
- 15.** Strengthen and instruct widespread use of the centralized national criminal database by the NPF and mandate access for other security agencies, providing resources to ensure this can be done. This should also include modernization of the national fingerprint database.
- 16.** The NSA in collaboration with civil security agencies should identify, map, and arrest cult group leaders, violent agitators, and networks of criminal groups at tertiary education level as well as society at large.
- 17.** The nation's dependence on import of basic security requirements should be reduced by enhancing the existing military production facilities and private companies across the country for immediate supply of needed equipment.
- 18.** Target poverty as a must; as poverty is the main driver for all the insecurity issues currently prevalent across the nation. This can be done through a focus on infrastructure and a new jobs' creation drive and initiative by the FGN. The Executive is also urged to consider doing even more by declaring a state of emergency on job creation - considering the high rate of unemployment.
- 19.** Nigeria must take major steps to control the flow of illegal arms into the country. The first step must strengthen the control of our borders to detect and seize any illegal shipment of arms into the country, and arrest and prosecute any person associated with the illegal flow of arms into the country. In the next step, Nigeria should reach out to overseas arms dealers to enlist their cooperation against the sales of arms to non- state actors. A third step should be a major diplomatic initiative with the governments of countries known to have companies engaged in selling arms to non-state actors. Continuous Arms-Collection and Depository scheme should be established national to encourage disposal and collection of illegal firearms.



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Nigeria must take major steps to control the flow of illegal arms into the country.

IMMEDIATE NEXT
STEPS FOR THE
LEGISLATURE

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LEGISLATURE**

IMMEDIATE NEXT
STEPS FOR THE
LEGISLATURE



1. Adoption of the Report of the Special Committee on National Security

***Presentation to the House
*Adoption by the House**

2. Passing the Report to Committee on Legislative Agenda to include the Recommendations in the Revised Legislative Agenda for the next two years,

3. Implementation plan on how and when the Legislative process will take place.

4. Draft Bills taken through the Legislative Process over the next two years

5. Each Bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate for Concurrence

6. Final NASS Bills passed on to the President for his signature.

7. Fulfilment of the Legislative Promise made to Nigerians

8. Working with the Executive to ensure implementation of all recommendations adopted.

IMMEDIATE NEXT
STEPS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE

**IMMEDIATE NEXT
STEPS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE**

IMMEDIATE NEXT
STEPS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE



**PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE
ORDER**

1. Delivery of Report to Mr President

2. Mr President sets up a Panel to examine the recommendation and how they can be implemented.

3. An Implementation Plan is produced for approval of Mr President.

4. A Presidential IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE is established to drive implementation.

5. Quaterly report is produced by the Committee

6. Legislative support is provided as necessary.

7. The Presidential Committee completes its work

MEDIUM TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS

**MEDIUM TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS**

MEDIUM TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS



The following are medium to longer term recommendations. It is important to note that the medium term recommendations overlap with the longer term ones by the nature of some of these recommendations. Medium term in this context indicates the time frame for completion.

Medium Term Recommendation

- 1.** Economic warfare aimed at degrading enemy productivity through identification and obstruction of their supply routes.
- 2.** Cryptographic warfare, including cryptanalysis aimed at intercepting enemy communications while defeating any attempts to intercept your own.
- 3.** Create a 3-4 digit, easy-to-memorize national emergency number and publish same for citizen awareness. This should replace the different numbers some states have created.
- 4.** Establish a resident database in each state to document all residents. This should also include mandatory registration of tenants (know your tenant) by landlords and mandatory registration of domestic employees (know your employee) on the resident database. All operators of commercial transportation services and members of transport unions should also be mandatorily registered on the database. This database should be linked to existing identification platforms like NIN, Drivers' license, National Passport and BVN.
- 5.** Create a limited window (3 months maximum) for any combatant on the side of the insurgents to surrender and be protected under a conditional amnesty programme which will protect them against prosecution, provide assistance (training and financial value equivalent to recovered weapons) to reintegrate them to normal society and protect them against reprisal attack by the insurgent groups in exchange for them giving useful intelligence to Government security forces.
- 6.** Restructure the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and resource the agency with competent and capable individuals that would:
 - a) Generate engaging audio-visual contents to stimulate national consciousness and patriotism.
 - b) Distribute the contents across multiple media channels (Radio, TV, social media, Newsprint) on a consistent and continuous basis.
 - c) Engage community organisations and religious institutions across the country as partners in the national orientation campaign.
 - d) Institute a reward and recognition program that identifies, rewards and showcases exemplary/sacrificial conducts by Nigerians that aligns with the ideals of patriotic citizenship.
 - e) The NOA should also partner existing private NGOs focused on fact-checking fake news to empower such NGOs with information that would enable them quickly to respond to fake news and reduce their damaging impact on public perception and psyche.

7. Alignment of all National Economic Policies and Programmes Under a Comprehensive National Economic Development Strategy (CNEDS) that establishes a ten-year baseline for monitoring and assessment of all economic policies and programmes towards ensuring compliance with national economic development directives and prevention of deviations from laid down outlines and frameworks.
8. Need to conduct a National Security Threat Assessment Studies (NSTAS) to determine the immediate, medium and long-term security threats to Nigeria both from internal and external sources, and provide contingency plans for mitigation, amelioration and neutralization of these threats. The study should focus on Air, Land and Maritime threats to Nigeria.
9. Need to conduct a Spatial Assessment of Threats to National Security (SATNS) such as those posed by the phenomenon of “ungoverned or ungovernable spaces” in Nigeria, to eliminate danger zones and hot spots of criminality and banditry across Nigeria.
10. Threat of Mass / Popular Uprising and National Security (M/PUNS) should focus on the various dimensions of mass or popular uprisings to determine their causes, and decide on strategies and tactics for responding to them such as evidenced by the #EndSARS protests and ensuing riots across several States of Nigeria.
11. Ensure that security services and their oversight bodies are not exempt from ambit of freedom of information legislation and instead require that decisions not to provide information are taken on a case-by-case basis, properly justified and subject to the supervision of an independent information/data commissioner.
12. Use of Dialogue: The basic approach of talking and listening by aggrieved parties, with a third-party mediating, not only calms nerves but has with empirical evidence proved to be best option of ensuring peace and security. The dialogues include inter-ethnic, inter-religious, inter-community, inter-personal, inter-ideological, state and non-state actors dialogue, inter-demographic among others.
13. Establishment of interventionist agencies to identify and provide little investment and sustenance opportunities to ex-convicts, jobless youths, discharged but indigents military and paramilitary personnel, among others; it is being alleged that most of the violent crimes are committed by these classes of the citizens.
14. Sourcing for security intelligence and security surveillance, both within and outside the country must be intensified by the SSS and NIA.
15. Rededicating Nigeria’s resolve to the pursuit of African regional integration with ECOWAS as one of the building blocks. Enhanced interaction with other regional actors would be necessary in this regard especially with the neighbouring States namely Niger and Benin Republic that are members of ECOWAS.

16. When communities of people or societies feel excluded from access to power, opportunity, services, and security, it creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or in the context of human rights abuses. In order to ensure that such grievances do not devolve into violence, government must proactively and directly target patterns of local and institutional exclusion. **To contain crisis means that government must proactively create economic opportunities for people.** This is because conflicts arise when groups contest access to power, resources, services, and security.
17. Ensure a more proactive protection of Nigerian cyberspace and electronic infrastructure from hacking and criminal interference.
18. Financial Sanctions and Travel Restrictions should form part of programs to prevent terrorists from financing their operations, including technical assistance to build the capacity of allies.
19. Assistance to Counter Terrorist Financing: The Central bank of Nigeria should consider efforts to develop financial sector oversight capabilities within African states necessary for preventing the transnational financing of terrorism. Many African banking systems remain vulnerable to terrorists and other criminals, and we need to track the flow of funds, conduct oversight of remittance systems, or freeze and confiscate terrorist-related assets.
20. Government should ensure that the law on terrorism is enforced to the letter without show of sentiment.
21. The security of our country's borders should be reviewed to ensure that all the nooks and crannies of the country's land borders through which aliens can enter the country are properly policed with structures and equipment in place with the immigration and customs and other security officials stationed there, to screen immigrants and emigrants accordingly.
22. Tighten arms control measures and sign-up cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries to enforce similar measures.
23. Create/Strengthen the intelligence unit within the Nigerian immigration service to generate useful analytics from immigration data (cross-border movements & correlations) and feed into the central intelligence pool by the DSS/SSS and NIA.
24. Convening of a summit meeting of ECOWAS leaders in Abuja under Mr. President's auspices, to discuss peace and security matters in the region, as well as make preparations for all important Continental and international high-level meetings with other ECOWAS Member-States to establish common positions and perspectives as much as practicable.
25. Convening of summit level meeting of the LCBC Member-States to address threats to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin, as well as discuss issues pertaining to resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons across the four countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.

- 26.** Convening of a summit level meeting of the Greater Sahel Region to define threats and challenges of variegated nature that face the entire region such as those emanating from Libya, Mali, The Sudan etc., and propose measures towards their amelioration.
- 27.** Enhanced cooperation with the African Union Commission (AUC) and other continental structures such as NEPAD and APRM should lead towards Nigeria's active engagement with the rest of the Continent, and adoption of a leadership posture in Africa.
- 28.** Nigeria should provide a leadership role and set the pace in harmonising the different security and economic organs that have sprung up within the Gulf of Guinea Commission Member-States for better securing of her southern approaches.
- 29.** Prioritising relations with the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Nigeria would need to redress her posture towards the Middle East particularly in relation to conflicts and mediation, containment of radical tendencies and extremism which have since become existential issues to many countries and governments both in the Middle East and Africa.
- 30.** Seize every opportunity to press Nigeria to fulfil its obligations under international law regarding torture, treatment of detainees and due process guarantees. Press about report of excessive use of force and extra-legal activity among Nigerian security forces and the importance of protecting human rights.
- 31.** Continue to press Nigeria, consistent with its obligations under the Rome Statute and the Principle of complementarity, to ensure that individuals implicated in serious crimes committed in violation of international law, including crimes against humanity, are investigated and prosecuted according to international fair trial standards.
- 32.** Require by law that external bodies responsible for scrutinizing security services make publicly available versions of their periodic investigation reports.
- 33.** It is recommended that a statutory requirement of a minimum of one working patrol vehicle per police station should be enacted. If the number of police station need to be reduced to make this happen, that will be acceptable, especially in urban areas when many stations are not far from each other.
- 34.** Inter-Agency cooperation should be mandated. A joint intelligence platform or system should be created with other law enforcement agencies to enable a unified assessment of threats and risks to national security.
- 35.** Make monthly security briefing to a combined NASS Committee by heads of security institutions compulsory by law.
- 36.** The authorities should establish the use of online reporting platform for crime reporting. All police officers should be trained in the use of modern technology as part of a new way of working.

- 37.** The NPF should strengthen and widen the operations of its Border Force Unit. They should be better equipped and trained to secure our national borders.
- 38.** The security function of the NSCDC should be defined to focus on community level policing and intelligence gathering operations. And states that have commissioned regional/ state level security outfits (Amotekun, Hisbah, Ebube Agu, etc.) should be required to merge these structures within the new NSCDC organisation that would be within the control of the State Government.
- 39.** To improve public confidence in the police, all police spokespersons must be put under a new statutory/legal duty not to mislead the public. Misleading the people or the media should become gross misconduct and sacking offence. People must be able to trust statements made by the police. This will help increase confidence in the police and earn them much needed public goodwill and support.
- 40.** Police should be brought under more local democratic accountability, even with a federal police command structure. A new State Advisory Boards (SABs) should be established by statute for each state command of the police. The SAB should include all key stakeholders in the state. This is not a security panel meeting the state Governors have with security chiefs in the state. The SAB will enable each local government areas bring to the table their top local challenges for the State Police Commissioner to review, respond and action.
- 41.** Section 215(5) of the constitution will require amendments to give effect section 46 of the same constitution that confers special jurisdiction to state high courts to entertain cases of violation of fundamental human rights by the Nigeria Police force in exercise of its powers under the constitution or any statutory law.
- 42.** National Assembly should exercise its powers under section 217(2)(c) to make laws to regulate circumstances under which the president may empower the Armed forces to suppress insurrections and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order.
- 43.** Section 4(d) of the police act, 2020 should be amended to regulate powers of the police. Specific provisions on the nature of collaboration between police and other security agencies should be clearly defined to indicate which agency plays 'lead' or 'supporting' role especially in joint operations.
- 44.** There is a need for objective criteria and mechanism for determining when and how the Armed forces can act in aid of civil authorities. A proper PROTOCOL should be put in place for this.
- 45.** Section 2 of the NSA Act should be amended to enhance the visibility of Defense intelligence agency under subsection (1) of that section and insert specific provisions that will facilitate inter-agency synergy among the agencies under the office of the National Security Adviser.
- 46.** Section 1a (3) of the Terrorism Act should be further amended to make adequate provisions for collaboration in intelligence gathering and sharing with penalties for default.
- 47.** Section 27(1)(a) of the NSCDC act should be amended to make ministerial directives specific to avoid conflict with presidential directives to the police or armed forces under the constitution or any relevant law.

- 48.** Enact new legislation and protocol to make it easier to hold security agencies and personnel's accountable for any security abuses in their areas of jurisdictions and command. This will involve amendment to the Sherriff Act for instance.
- 49.** Breaking of Nigeria's Communities into clusters with security codes given to each cluster and local informants recruited by the Police.
- 50.** Embark on an effective disarmament process to recover all illegal arms and ammunition in circulation in local communities. A multiplicity of strategies including incentives should be employed to ensure success.
- 51.** Set up structures for observing and reporting the behaviour of security/ military personnel from community to national levels in a way that promotes public confidence and accountability. This may require a new National helpline being created that will take calls from citizens nationwide.
- 52.** Create a national legal framework that will provide full anonymity and protection of informers and under-cover agents in security matters.
- 53.** Geofencing farmlands and other critical infrastructure. A geofence is a virtual boundary that can be created, viewed and edited visually on an interactive map in order to monitor a specific location and the movement of any target relative to this location.
- 54.** A distinct Salary Scale for the police outside of the unified public service pay scales should be created to reflect the full scale of the work being done by the police in Nigeria.
- 55.** It is recommended that the police authorities should produce as a minimum, a five-year strategic plan, that will itemise its funding requirements and operational strategy over that period. The budgets allocated will therefore track this plan and allow for multi-year settlement to be possible. The era of reactive annual firefighting must come to an end
- 56.** A System of terror alert levels should be introduced. Increasing public vigilance and resilience: Providing an accurate and balanced assessment of a terrorist threat is critical to the successful mobilization of public support and the encouragement of public vigilance.
- 57.** Change to Police posting regime. Police leaders should ensure that police officers working with communities are assigned for a long-enough period to allow them to develop a sophisticated understanding of those communities and to build trusting relationships with members that, in turn, can facilitate effective engagement and co-operation with the public.
- 58.** Section 1(4)(a), armed forces act should be amended to whether the scope of power of enforcing and assisting to enforce immigration laws by the navy is subject to control of the immigration service or otherwise.
- 59.** Procurement and deployment of technology-based boarder management equipment and devices; with distanced, efficient and effective controls rooms

60. The Almajiri system should be reformed in order to make the children in the system useful to themselves and the society. To this end, education must be aggressively pursued and made compulsory for all the children.
61. As a matter of public policy, a law should be enacted giving all serving police officers free travel privileges on all government (local, state and federal) owned transportation systems (with the exception of air travel). This will ease the operational movement of the police in emergencies, but also reduce the transportation budget of the police or at least make the funds available go further.

MEDIUM TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS

**LONG TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS**

MEDIUM TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS



The following are longer term recommendations. It is important to note that these set of recommendations in this context indicates the implementation time frame for completion. They can be started in the short to medium term but will require a longer term approach and timeframe for full and effective implementation.

Long Term Recommendations

- 1.** Comprehensive Survey of National Infrastructure Facilities (CSNIF) to ascertain the security of key national infrastructure facilities and their economic viability over a determined period of time.
- 2.** Reduce proliferation of hard drugs, as there is a direct link between hard drug use and the level of violence in a community. This will require special funding being made available to the NDLEA.
- 3.** Ensure better representation of women in security agencies at all levels.
- 4.** Strategic training and re-training of the community leaders who often act as change agents and role models in the communities/societies.
- 5.** Deliberate effort should be made by the Nigerian security sector as a whole to promote the learning of French language. All our neighbouring countries are French speaking.
- 6.** Financial Sanctions and Travel Restrictions: Establish Programs to prevent terrorists from financing their operations, including technical assistance to build the capacity of allies.
- 7.** To revitalize the Gulf of Guinea Commission and spearhead initiatives in concert with other Member States towards tackling all security threats emanating from the Atlantic zone of the country.
- 8.** Establishment by government of a witness protection program and proper training of security and justice personnel to ensure compliance with international due process standards.
- 9.** A “Federal Police, Local Policy” system should be developed. The priorities of the police in each state and divisions should reflect local needs and preference rather than a nationally imposed operational priority.

The priorities of the police in each state and divisions should reflect local needs and preference rather than a nationally imposed operational priority.

This will mean Nigeria will continue to operate national police but with locally decided priorities. This will create more local accountability for the police, thus improving links with the communities. This will also begin to sow the seed of policing by consent in the minds of serving officers.

- 10.** The relevant House of Representatives committee responsible for oversight functions in agencies like NDLEA, NIS and NOA should develop scorecards for measuring their effectiveness and work with open data providers like the NBS to ensure these metrics are continuously collated and analysed for public consumption – to build a performance culture in the agencies on the one hand and also to gain public confidence in the agencies.
- 11.** Promote the establishment of domestic military-industrial complexes led by the private sector for the production of essential materials for the military and security forces especially those basic and most essential items.
- 12.** Deliver on the basic concept of developing land, air and sea based electronic surveillance, interception and suppression systems that would meet the requirements of both offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities for the country. A Territorial Defence System (TDS) apportioned appropriately to the Police, Army, Navy and Air Force respectively, and also encompassing other sectors in the intelligence gathering and analysis architecture, should serve as the platform to enable each arm to operate either singly or in tandem in a cascading or overlapping manner.
- 13.** Introduce tri-service command system. Amplifying the role of the sector commanders to be in charge of all AFN Soldiers under them regardless of which service they come from. The Sector commander should also be able deploy assets and resources needed regardless of the military service involved and without a need to secure permission for the service chiefs.
- 14.** Create new structure to make security personnel accountable to both the state and communities in which they operate even if indirectly. Police Area Commanders should be made to produce a report of their stewardship every three months. This report should be shared with the Local Security Committees nationwide.
- 15.** Widespread deployment and utilization of modern surveillance equipment such as drones, CCTVs, aircrafts, telegraphic and electronic monitors to the localities and communities.

APPENDICES

- 1** Active intelligence Ltd: An integrated fusion centric approach to security challenges.
- 2** Cleen Foundation: Memoranda on National security.
- 3** Sambus Geospatial: Geospatial solutions for National security.
- 4** Aihoop Integrated services: Call for Memoranda.
- 5** Gray child Foundation: Memorandum on National security.
- 6** Vigilante Group of Nigeria: A Memorandum.
- 7** UI Reunion Group (1982-1992) Class: University of Ibadan Alumni.
- 8** Ambassador Usman Sarki, Former Deputy Permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations. Current directing staff at National institute for Policy and strategic studies: Call for Memorandum.
- 9** Niger Delta Dialogue: Memorandum on Recommendations regarding Niger Delta security situations.
- 10** Sticmirac International Limited: This memorandum is focused with emphasis on the thematic Local and Community level Security Options and Solutions.
- 11** Rock Founders Security Limited: Three Innovative Practical Solutions to Nigeria Security Challenges.
- 12** National Association of Uniform Voluntary Organization: Submission of Memorandum on Local and Community level security options and solutions/Non-military and Non kinetic security options and solutions.
- 13** Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC): Memoranda on National Security.
- 14** Society for Monitoring and Evaluation Nigeria: Options and Solutions to National Security issues.
- 15** Emancipate Nigeria: Memorandum on Proposed solutions to National Security challenges.
- 16** Nigerian Legion: Call for Memoranda.
- 17** Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Working Paper, overlapping mandates of security and law enforcement agencies in Nigeria.
- 18** ALGON, Association of Local Government Nigeria. Local and Security challenges of Nigeria.
- 19** Academic Staff Union of Research institutions: Memorandum on National Security.
- 20** Abdullahi Haruna, SAN & Co. Legal Practitioners & Consultants: Local and Community level Security options and solutions.
- 21** Club 582: Memorandum Submitted to the House of Representatives Committee on National security.

- 22** One Star Veterans Association (OSVA): Call for Memoranda.
- 23** Hamza Ahman, Vista Consultants: Employment of Private Military Contractors to tackle insecurity in Nigeria.
- 24** Association of Licensed Private Security Practitioners of Nigeria: call for Memoranda.
- 25** Lukman Giwa: Local and Community level security options and solutions.
- 26** Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies: Memorandum on Local and Community level Security options and Solutions.
- 27** Directorate of Project Monitoring, National Youth Council of Nigeria. Ogun State chapter: Comprehensive study of the issues and challenges of National security and recommended innovative and practical solutions.
- 28** Mallam Ali Usman: Concrete Solutions to the insecurity in Nigeria.
- 29** Aliyu Yahaya Dorayi, Voice For Credible Leadership: My Contribution to My Country Nigeria concerning the ways to tackle the issue of insecurity.
- 30** National Association of Criminologists & Security Practitioners of Nigeria: Memorandum on National security.
- 31** Built Environment Professionals: Call for memoranda.
- 32** ASIS International: Memoranda on the Issues and Challenges of National Security in Nigeria.
- 33** Samie Ihejirika, Strategic Empowerment & Mediation Agency: Memorandum to the House Committee on National Security.
- 34** Savannah Center: Final Memorandum to the National Assembly
- 35** Dr Ogbonna Onyeisi: Call for memoranda.
- 36** Bishop Prof. Ezekiel Nyenwegwe, Bishop Prof. Funmilayo Adesanya-Davies, Barrister Bunmi Akaakar (NSCEA): National Security : The Way Forward for Nigeria.
- 37** Lawyers Alert: Memorandum on Local & Community level security and Non-military & non-kinetic security options and solutions.
- 38** Abolaji Albert, Wits & Brawn Ltd: Security Consciousness through control of weapons.
- 39** The G8 Consortium of Security Experts: Response to Call for Memoranda.
- 40** Man O War: Call for Memoranda.
- 41** Adoyi Onoja: Submission of Memorandum.
- 42** Ibokwe Michael: Security Solutions.
- 43** Dr Isa Munkaila: Memorandum.
- 44** Rev. John Joseph Hayab, Chairman Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN): Memoranda to Special Committee on National security.
- 45** Abegunde Moyosore Bolarinde: Solution to Nigerian Insecurity.
- 46** Victor Nick Gai: Call for Memoranda on Challenges of National Security.
- 47** Rock Founders Security Limited: Memoranda.

- 48** Global love Ambassadors: A non-military and non-kinetic security option and solution.
- 49** Professor Nelson Fasina, Alhaji Mohd Kansalem, Adedoyin Nureni: Memoranda.
- 50** Stephen Obochi Okwori, STICMIRAC International Limited: A Memorandum form Stricmirac.
- 51** Lawal Razaq Olatunji and Dauda Taoheed Olawale: Solutions to Insecurity in Nigeria.
- 52** Joel Thomas : The role of Vigilantes in Internal Security and Community Policing.
- 53** Engr. Obinna Orji: National Security.
- 54** Florence Kayemba Ibokabasi, Stakeholder Democracy Network: Memorandum: Non-military and Non-kinetic Security Options and Solutions to Cultism in the Niger delta.
- 55** Oniyarabi David Opeyemi: Community security.
- 56** Bala Mohammed Audi: A memoranda for a practical solution to insecurity in Nigeria.
- 57** Patriots of Peace and Safety International Foundation: Memorandum on Non military and Non kinetic security options and solutions.
- 58** Anumah Abdulraheem Okehi: Local Community Level Security options and solutions.
- 59** Steve Aghaiyo: Solution to Nigeria's problem.
- 60** Dr. Jeffrey Onyejefu Isima (PhD): Memorandum for National Security.
- 61** Henrietta Onwuegbuzie, PhD: Proposed Solution to Nigeria's security issue.
- 62** Dr. A. J. Suleiman: Memorandum on innovative and practical solutions to Challenges of National security.
- 63** Association of Heads of Security of Tertiary Institutions, Loss Prevention service Ltd: Call for Memoranda- Local and Campus Community Level Security options and solutions.
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EDITORIAL & SUPPORT TEAM

Production of this report and organising the preceding Special Summit on National Security involved the support and collaboration of several other people and organisations. So, as the Head of the Technical and Summit teams, I will like to appreciate them all for their contributions. Special thanks go to the following people as well:

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Additionally, I will like to thank all the thousands of individuals and groups that made submissions to the Committee or whose report contributed to our perspectives. Our gratitude also goes to the Centre for Democracy and Development and the Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development for their support.

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